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This thesis explores the main trends and drivers of the relationship between states of the 
Kingdom of Denmark and the Russian Federation in the Arctic in 2007-2019. The 
research topic belongs to the International Relations study, and its sub discipline named 
foreign policy analysis. The aim of the thesis is to enrich the present bulk of research on  
Danish-Russian relations in the Arctic due to its scare amount and the increasing 
significance of the Arctic in international relations. The entire analysis is based on neo-
realism and geopolitics premises. The topic is approached through analyses of such areas 
as Arctic governance, economy, military sector, science and the environment.  
 
The research applies the qualitative document analysis. The broad range of primary 
sources contains laws, strategies and concepts adopted by Danish and Russian authorities; 
international agreements; speeches, addresses, interviews and comments of Danish, 
Russian and other relevant politicians and officials; as well as reports and publications 
from governmental and non-governmental organizations, research institutes, corporations 
and media featuring Danish-Russian relations in the Arctic and the Arctic itself. The 
material includes information published in English, Danish, German and Russian. The 
desktop (Internet) research technique is utilized in the study. Comparative analysis, case 
study analysis and process tracing analysis are the main methodological tools. 
 
The thesis reveals that the main drivers of Danish and Russian Arctic policies are 
determined by their endeavor to enhance power capabilities and by their positions in the 
international system. Both states share cooperation mood in the Arctic. This cooperation   
can be traced in all sectors at larger or lesser extents. Meanwhile, Danish-Russian 
relations experience the pressure of the global level. The current tension between such 
great/super great powers as the US, the EU and Russia has its spillover effect on Danish-
Russian relations in the Arctic, which hinders their cooperation. Still, by and large, 
relations among great/super great powers in the Arctic region are of peaceful nature that 
create a real possibility for cooperation between Denmark and Russia in the nearest 
future.  
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INTRODUCTION  
 
 
The issue 
 
At present, the Arctic has become a top agenda of International Relations (IR). This 
increasing significance of the Arctic is determined by several factors. 
 
Firstly, the Arctic is one of the richest regions in the world in terms of natural resources. 
According to the US Geology Service, the Arctic possesses 30% of the world’s 
undiscovered natural gas and 13% of the world’s undiscovered oil. Approximately 84% 
of those resources are expected to occur offshore.1 
 
 
Figure 1. Energy Resources in the Arctic (Source: Hansen 2016) 
 
The vast resource deposits attracted a great deal of attention to the Arctic due to the 
presence of several simultaneous processes. They are depleting currently developed oil 
and gas deposits on the background of growth population, leading to increase in demand 
for energy resources and the concurrent trend of Global Warming that makes the Arctic 
                                                          
1 Bird et al. 2008; Ernst & Yong 2013, 2 
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natural resources more accessible. Therefore, the Arctic has its prominent position in 
future global energy policy.2 
 
 
 
Figure 2. World Energy Consumption (Source: U. S. Energy Information Administration 
2018) 
 
Secondly, the Arctic is a region with promising new sea routes making it possible for 
ships to travel to the world’s three most developed continents. Ice melting with following 
opening of ice-free waters determines possible development of the four Trans-Arctic sea 
routes. They are the Northern Sea Route (NSR), the North-West Passage, the Transpolar 
Sea Route and the Arctic Bridge Route.3 The NSR is perceived as more realistic in terms 
of immediate employment, which can be explained geographically. The NSR is less 
covered by ice than its counterparts and is likely to be free of ice first.4 Hence, the Arctic 
has its position in the global communication net. 
 
                                                          
2 Andreev 2014; U. S. Energy Information Administration 2018, 6 
3 Rodrigue 2017 
4 Ibid 
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Figure 3. Arctic Shipping Routes (Source: Fleener 2013) 
 
Thirdly, the Arctic is a region with great significance in military terms. The Arctic is 
strategically significant for both the US as the leading NATO state and the Russian 
Federation as the state with the longest Arctic coast since the shortest airway between 
them lies through the Arctic.5 Therefore, military prominence of the Arctic is very high, 
particularly now, in time of crisis in NATO-Russian relations. 
 
At last but not the least, the Arctic is a region, which according to the geopolitical school, 
due to its rich natural resources and strategic importance with respect of communications 
can and certainly attracts special attention of states.6 The detailed elaboration of 
geopolitical school presumptions and their further employment in my work will be 
presented later.  
 
However, the emergence of new opportunities in the Arctic may well exacerbate existing 
contradictions. The issue of access to economic activities in the region as well as 
territorial disputes, primarily, among Arctic states, so called members of the “Arctic 
Club”, are some of good examples of this assumption.  
 
Denmark and Russia are members of the mentioned above “Arctic Club”, the relations of 
which arouse the academic interest due to their geopolitical locations. Denmark is an 
                                                          
5 Henriksen and  Rahbek-Clemmensen 2017, 76;  RIA NOVOSTI January 23, 2014 
6 Tamnes  and  Offerdal  2014, 6 
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Arctic coastal state. It possesses the largest island in the Arctic, Greenland, with many 
unexplored oil and gas deposits.7 The state holds a unique position in the Arctic being 
simultaneously a member of two supranational organizations: the EU and NATO.8 
Denmark is also a permanent member of the Arctic Council addressing issues concerning 
the Arctic.9 Having Greenland within its borders, the Kingdom presents a state claiming 
expanding its territory in the Arctic.10 This topic is urgent as territories claimed by 
Denmark overlap with the areas claimed by Russia.11 Therefore, Danish-Russian relations 
in the Arctic are likely to be characterized by some researchers as controversial ones with 
territorial disputes in their core.12  
 
 
Figure 4. Territorial Claims in the Arctic (Source: BBC 2014) 
 
With regard to Russia, the following points must be emphasized. It is an Arctic coastal 
state with permanent membership in the Arctic Council like Denmark.13 However, unlike 
                                                          
7 Jacobsen 2016 
8 IMUNA (International Model United Nations Associations) n. d. 
9 Arctic Council 2015 (a) 
10 Redder 2014 
11 Damkjær 2015; RIA NOVOSTI September 7, 2016 
12 Schümer 2015; Hannestad  2014 (a); Hannestad  2014 (b) 
13 Arctic Council 2015 (a) 
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other Arctic states, Russia possesses the largest share of the Arctic territories.14 According 
to the US Geology Service, Russia has the biggest deal of unexplored oil and gas deposits 
in the Arctic.15 The Russian Arctic zone is also the most populated and the most 
industrious part of the region.16 In contrast to other Arctic States, the Arctic zone plays a 
significant role in the Russian economy in general.17 Therefore, disputed territories with 
Denmark are of high value for Russia.  
 
Looking back to the written history of Danish-Russian relations, one can count more than 
500 years. During this period, Danish-Russian relations did not witness any military 
conflict. Following the words of the Russian Foreign Minister Sergej Lavrov “our 
[Danish-Russian] relations are unique to a certain extent. The first agreement between 
our countries was signed almost 515 years ago. Since then, Denmark and Russia have 
never, not a single day, not a single hour fought".18 Moreover, the royal houses of the 
Kingdom of Denmark and the Russian Empire were connected.19  
 
Despite peaceful nature of Danish-Russia relations, in general, there were times of 
tension. As a rule, they coincided with increasing polarization at the global level, as in a 
case of “Chechen issue”, “Georgian issue” and “Ukrainian issue”.20 This coincidence is 
explained by Danish membership in the EU and NATO. 
 
At present, Denmark as other EU member-states support sanctions imposed on Russia in 
2014 and joined the sanctions imposed in 2019 concerning Russian shipbuilding.21 In this 
case, I deliberately employ the term Denmark, rather than the Kingdom of Denmark, as 
Greenland and the Faroe Islands are not the EU members.22  
 
                                                          
14 Chilingarov 2013, 7-8 
15 Bird et al. 2008 
16 Pelyasov 2013 
17 RIA NOVOSTI September 22, 2010 
18 Lavrov and  Møller  2008 
19 Denmark in Russia. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark n. d. 
20 Based on analyses of press releases of Danish and Russian Ministries of Foreign 
Affairs 
21 European Union: Newsroom n. d.   
22 Embassy of the Russian Federation in the Kingdom of Denmark n. d. (a) 
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Denmark is also a state which uncertainty on granting permission for construction and 
operation of Nord Stream 2 in its territorial waters delays the realization of this grand 
project within Russian energy sector.23  
 
Hence, Danish-Russian relations, as a whole, consonants with the main tendencies of the 
global level where the tension between Russia from one side and the EU and the US from 
the other side exists. Here we can find an obvious testimony of the neo-realist assumption 
that the global level determines states’ behavior, especially when it comes to such a small 
state as Denmark.24 
 
Thus, this thesis seeks to investigate in what way Danish-Russian relations evolve both 
at the global and national levels.  
 
 
Research question 
 
Though the Arctic presents a considerable importance for actors and there is plenty of 
works studying the Arctic at large, Danish-Russian relations have seen very modest 
research efforts. For sure, there is a drastic lack of fundamental works to coordinate 
dispersed knowledge and information on the issue of the thesis.   
 
My thesis is devoted to Danish-Russian relations in the Arctic (2007-2019). The selection 
of the year 2007 as a starting point is not arbitrary. I argue that 2007 was a crucial year 
not just in the development of Danish-Russian relations in the Arctic but also in the Arctic 
region itself.  
 
Firstly, it was 2007 when the head of Russian Arctic Expedition Mr. Chilingarov planted 
the Russian Flag into the Arctic Seabed, which triggered the immediate reaction of other 
states and brought the Arctic to the top of agenda in International Relations. Following 
the words of Danish Foreign Minister  Per Stig Møller (2001-2010), after this event he 
woke up “soaked in perspiration with the head full of Russian submarines.”25 In fact, the 
                                                          
23 Brzozowski 2019 
24 Waltz 1979; Mathisen 1971; Rosenau 1966; Handel 1981; Bjol 1971; Branner 2000 
25 Møller, Per Stig quoted in Jacobsen 2016 
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Russian flag in the Arctic Seabed initiated the discussions on the Arctic legal status, which 
led to the signing of the Ilulissat Declaration (2008), one of the main documents 
regulating states’ relations in the Arctic.26   
 
Secondly, it was 2007 when the record sea ice melt in the Arctic was registered.27 The 
Arctic was no more seen as a frozen territory but in contrast as a region with new business 
opportunities such as shipping, oil and gas exploitation, tourism, fishery etc.28 
 
 
Figure 5. Annual Sea Ice Minimum (Source: Cole 2007) 
 
Finally, it was 2007 when increase in oil prices occurred and made the Arctic with its 
natural resources a crucial region in terms of energy.29  
 
 
Figure 6. Oil Price Rise (Source: BBC n. d.)  
 
                                                          
26 Ilulissat Declaration 2008 
27 Cole 2007 
28 Ibid 
29 Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco 2007 
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The subject of the thesis belongs to the IR study, and its sub discipline named foreign 
policy analysis. Inspired by the words of one of the most prominent researchers in the 
foreign policy analysis Christopher Hill: “both explaining and understanding are 
necessary parts of good foreign policy analysis”, this thesis aims at extending the existing 
body of research by examining the nature of Danish-Russian relations in the Arctic (2007-
2019).30  
 
So, my thesis is supposed to answer the following research question: What are the main 
trends and drivers of the relationship between states of the Kingdom of Denmark and the 
Russian Federation in the Arctic in 2007-2019? In order to respond the above-mentioned 
research question I will address the following points: What is Danish policy towards the 
Arctic? What is Russian Policy towards the Arctic? What drives the dynamic of Denmark 
and Russia’s Arctic policies? What is the nature of Danish-Russian relations in the Arctic 
in the following spheres: the Arctic governance, economy, science, the environment and 
military area? What kind of Danish-Russian relations can we expect in the nearest future? 
How can the empirical case of Danish-Russian relations be seen through the lenses of the 
neo-realist and geopolitics theories? 
 
 
Relevance 
 
The study of Danish-Russian relations has a great relevance for the theory development. 
The study, providing empirical case, can contribute to neo-realism and geopolitics in 
general and specific areas of IR research, such as the study of small states that has a 
tendency to be overlooked in comparison with the study of great powers. Particularly, it 
will contribute to the filling the gap, that exists in the studying relationship between the 
small state aligned with one of the great powers and another “assertive” great power. In 
effect, most of the researches concern the relationship between the small state and its 
aligned “great power” when the relationship of the same small state with not aligned 
“assertive” great power is just seen through the lenses of small state’s commitment 
towards aligned great power. In this study, I want to violate this tradition, and put the 
                                                          
30 Hill 2003, 30 
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relationship of the “aligned” small state with an assertive, at least not aligned great power, 
in the foreground. 
 
Besides its theoretical importance, the research of Danish-Russian relations has great 
relevance for the real world. Nowadays, when the world witnesses the next polarization 
in the International System, new military conflicts such as Ukrainian and Syrian crises, 
the study of Danish-Russian relations comprising a potential element of conflict due to 
territorial disputes in the Arctic gets great significance. Since there is high vulnerability 
of the Arctic ecosystem and its sustainability to any potential military conflicts, any 
conflict in the Arctic can lead to the global disaster.31 So, understanding the relations 
between these two states in the Arctic can provide knowledge that can help to predict 
conflicts or give an example of how to deal with them.  
 
The relevance of studying Danish-Russian relations can be also defined in respect of the 
EU-Russian relations. It is worth noticing that the EU-Russian relations are crucial for 
the development of the EU Common Foreign Policy. Following the words of former EU 
Trade Commissioner, Peter Mandelson “no other country reveals our deference as does 
Russia. This is a failure of Europe as a whole, not only member state in particular”.32 The 
investigation of Danish-Russian relations will give the excellent opportunity of revealing 
consistency as well as discrepancy between Denmark’s and the EU’s policies towards 
Russia and, since that, contributes to further elaboration of problems of EU Common 
Foreign Policy. 
 
 
Background research 
 
To start with, one should note that there is a lack of literature devoted to Danish- Russian 
relations in general. The subject is not a top priority in Danish and Russian scientific 
traditions. The works, still little amount of them, investigating Danish-Russian relations 
primarily focus on their economy aspect.33 Meanwhile International Relations research 
concerning Danish-Russian relations in a retrospective view are scarce. At the same time, 
                                                          
31 Bettwy 2015 
32 Mandelson 2007 
33 Liuhto 2018; Volkov 2017 
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no research of Danish-Russian relations in the context of the Arctic was discovered. Due 
to this fact, my work is predominantly based on primary sources.  
 
However, there is a certain amount of works employed in my thesis. They can be 
subdivided into several groups. 
 
Firstly, there are works devoted to the issue of the Arctic in general. The IR research on 
the Arctic have been generally empirical and can be subdivided into three major IR 
schools:  realism (geopolitics), institutionalism and constructivism.  
 
The realist view on states’ relations in the Arctic was a predominant approach during the 
Cold War, which was correlated with the superpower tension and military significance of 
the region.34 The explicit example of such research is the “The Age of the Arctic.” by 
Oran R. Young, published in 1985. This work is symbolically prominent as it was one of 
the first works forecasting future global significance of the Arctic.35 In his research, 
Young emphasizes security issues in the region and does not anticipate great cooperation 
in the region. Following him, the only field that can be characterized by cooperation in 
the future is the environment. 
 
After the end of the Cold War the realist view, with pessimistic scenario on cooperation 
in the Arctic, was substituted to more optimistic vision. The possibility of peaceful and 
more developed cooperation between states in the Arctic was pointed out. Following one 
of the prominent researchers of the Arctic, Clive Archer, the Arctic offers nice conditions 
for cross border cooperation in the humanitarian field, in scientific research and the 
environment.36 This phenomenon was correlated to the emerging Arctic Environmental 
Protection Strategy and following establishment of the Arctic Council and Euro-Barents 
Cooperation. Works of that period primarily concern the evaluation of states’ 
collaboration within circumpolar organizations.37 Most researchers admit the fact that the 
                                                          
34 DIIS 1997; Young  1985- 1986  
35 Young  1985- 1986 
36 Archer 1988, 140 
37 Stokke 1990; Caron 1993; Scrivener 1999; Young 2002; Young 2005 
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expected level of cooperation was not achieved and did not generate high political interest 
in the Arctic affairs.38  
 
Another chronological crucial point in the development of the scientific tradition of 
analyzing the Arctic was the year 2007. The steel flag planted by the Russian scientist in 
the Arctic Seabed set the Arctic debate on the top of the agenda of scientific research. 
One of the first attempts to register and analyze new developments in the Arctic was made 
by Scot Borgerson in his article “Arctic Meltdown: The Economic and Security 
Implications of Global Warming.” Borgerson presents overall picture of transformation 
of the Arctic region. He emphasizes the role of the climate change in the “opening” of the 
Arctic. Following his words: “The Arctic Ocean is melting, and it is melting fast. […] It 
is no longer a matter of if, but when, the Arctic Ocean will open to regular marine 
transportation and exploration of its lucrative natural-resource deposits.”39 Borgerson 
stresses the lack of overarching political structure and agreements in the region for further 
peaceful development and forecasts the rivalry of the states for natural resources and 
conflicts on this issue. 
 
Since then, the topic of the possibility of the struggle for the Arctic has become the main 
one in research field. In general, most researchers do not support the idea of the inevitable 
scramble for the Arctic.40 They state several factors determining peaceful development 
of the relations between states. Firstly, new oil and gas findings were primarily discovered 
in undisputed Arctic territories, within the line of the states’ national borders. 
Consequently, there was no expectation of great conflicts in the delimitation issue in the 
Arctic. Secondly, the well-developed functioning of the United Nations Commission on 
the Continental Shelf and the Law of the Sea provided legal tool for resolving territorial 
disputes in the region. Finally, the proclaimed devotion of the Arctic States to resolve all 
controversial issues under current international laws and agreements ensured non-conflict 
development. 
                                                          
38 Scrivener 1999; Hønneland 1998 
39 Borgerson 2008, 63 
40 Ebinger and Zambetakis 2009; Dodds 2010; Brosnan et all. 2011     
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The issue of adopting of overarching Arctic Treaty akin to Antarctic Treaty was another 
topic of scientific discussion. There were both proponents and opponents of such a 
treaty.41 
 
The certain amount of works on the Arctic are framed by institutionalism. They analyze 
the Artcic in terms of the international regime.42 The main emphasis has been made on 
cooperation and the role of the Arctic Council and Law of Sea in building the Arctic 
regime.  
 
Several studies on the Arctic as a region, particularly on discussions of the Arctic identity, 
region constructing and geopolitics in the regional cooperation arrangements correspond 
to the premises of constructivism.43 
 
Secondly, there are works devoted to the investigation of the main drivers in Danish and 
Russian Arctic policies. Still, these works feature policies of both states not in comparison 
to each other but rather are inclined to uncover policies of each state in the region from 
the perspective of their national interests.  
 
The realist school is quite strong in Danish scientific research, concerning Danish Arctic  
Policy. Research conducted by such Danish scientists as Mark Jacobsen,  John Rahbek-
Clemmensen and  Anders Henriksen cover the issue of Danish policy in the Arctic.44 
They analyze the Danish approach to the Arctic from the realist assumptions. They argue 
that Danish Arctic policy is determined by the Denmark’s small state status. They 
conclude that the key issue of the Danish Arctic policy is Greenland, particularly the 
question of its presence within the Kingdom of Denmark. In turn, Greenland’s importance 
is caused by its significance in the promotion of the status of the Kingdom of Denmark 
in the eyes of its “super great power” alliance, the US. They also emphasize the Danish 
endeavor to elude the possibility of conflicts in the region. John Rahbek-Clemmensen and 
Anders Henriksen argue the concurrent process of transformation of the “Greenland 
                                                          
41 Rothwell 2008; Stokke 2007; Young 2011 
42 Koivurova 2010; Stokke 2007   
43 Joenniemi 1989; Neumann 1994;  Aalto et al. 2003;  Keskitalo 2007;  Browning 2010 
44 Jacobsen 2016; Henriksen and  Rahbek-Clemmensen 2017 
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Card” into the “Arctic Card” which takes place in Danish-US relations.45 Thus, these 
works have contributed a lot in the understanding of the main drivers of the Kingdom of 
Denmark in the Arctic. 
 
There are a lot of research on the Russian Arctic Policy. As in the case of research on 
Danish Arctic Policy, the realist school is a predominant approach in the analysis of 
Russian Arctic policy. In terms of defining the nature of Russian policy in the field, there 
are two well-defined and opposing discourses on Russian drivers in the Arctic policy.  
 
The first group of research describes Russian Arctic Policy as assertive and aggressive 
inheriting incentives for the struggle for the Arctic.46 The Russian flag planting in the 
Arctic Seabed is referred as the best example of such Russian “behavior” which is 
explained by Russia’s endeavor to successfully compete for the Arctic natural resources, 
trade routes and, at the large extent, by the intention to restore its imperial ambitions. 
 
The second group of research features Russian actions in the Arctic from the perspective 
of its national interests that can be explained in terms of legitimacy, so they do not 
overcome interests of other Arctic states.47 By and large, this group of authors focuses on 
Russia’s development of the Russian Arctic Zone, primarily its natural resources, and 
Russia’s position to cooperate on various Arctic matters with other actors in the region, 
using peaceful tools, such as international law and international platforms of interaction.  
 
Thirdly, there are works devoted to the Arctic governance. The main concept of the Arctic 
Governance is reflected in the scientific works by Marc Jacobsen, Hans Mouritzen and, 
John Rahbek-Clemmensen.48 The authors point out the multi-level nature of the Arctic 
governance with the Arctic states as primary actors. They emphasize deliberate actions 
taken by the Arctic states to expel other non-Arctic states from the direct participation in 
the Arctic governance. 
 
                                                          
45 Henriksen and  Rahbek-Clemmensen 2017 
46 Tayloe 2015; Giles and Smith 2007; Dugin 1991; Josephson 2014 
47 Belov 2012; Alexandrov 2009; Diev 2009; Heininen 2011 
48 Jacobsen 2016; Mouritzen 2018;  Rahbek-Clemmensen 2011 
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Fourthly, there is research on the development of Danish-Russian economic relations in 
general. Though the amount of such works is not great, for instance the ones prepared by 
Kari Liuhto and Alexei Volkov. To sum up, the authors agree that Danish-Russian 
economic relations can be characterized as modest.49  
 
Fifthly, there is research covering the sphere of Arctic oil and gas exploitation by the 
Arctic states including the Kingdom of Denmark and Russia.50 They provide great 
empirical data on this issue. 
 
Sixthly, there are works concerning the development of the shipping industry in the Arctic 
in general. Marcus Matheus Keup and Pavel Devyatkin analyze pros and cons of shipping 
operations in the Arctic through the NSR.51 In turn, Pavel Devyatkin pays special 
attention to the Russian dimension of the NSR development.52 
 
Seventhly, there are works devoted to the Arctic tourism. Dmitrij Medvedev, Yuriy 
Golubchikov, Victor Kruzhalin and Aleksandra Nikanorova present the general trends of 
the Arctic tourism by providing empirical data and future scenario of this development53. 
 
Eighthly, there is research on the military aspect of the Arctic. The work by Anders 
Henriksen, and Jon Rahbek-Clemmensen stress the military significance of the region for 
the Russian Federation and the US.54 They highlight the Danish position on the 
demilitarized Arctic with low NATO’s involvement. The Danish intention to keep 
peaceful surrounding in the region is explained by the natural fear of the small state 
located next to the super/great powers to be squeezed in the case of a military conflict 
between them.  
 
The Russian perspective on military issue is well analyzed. All researchers agree on the 
fact that increase of Russian military actions in the Arctic can be registered. However, 
                                                          
49 Liuhto 2018; Volkov 2017 
50 Afanasyeva 2013; Kaznacheev and Bazaleva 2016; Panichkin 2016; Koptelov 2012; 
Andronova 2012 
51 Devyatkin 2018;  Keupp 2015 
52 Devyatkin 2018 
53 Medvedev 2015; Golubchikov et al.2018 
54 Henriksen and Rahbek-Clemmensen 2017 
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there are two camps in terms of defining the main drivers behind Russian military actions. 
Researchers belonging to the first camp consider the Russian military build-up as an 
attempt to accumulate its great power status, and define Russia’s military actions assertive 
in nature. The proponents of the first camp are Ekaterina Piskunova, Paul R. Josephson, 
Aleksandr Dugin and Sergej Medvedev.55  
 
The proponents of the second camp are Artur Chilingarov, Valery Konyshev, and 
Aleksandr Sergunin, Pavel Devyatkin, Aleksandr Kramchikhin and Lassi   Heininen.56 
They emphasize the defensive nature of the Russian military actions, particularly 
determined by endeavor to secure its north vast border as well as provide search and 
rescue operations. The intensive military actions are also explained by the necessity to 
update old military units within the modernization programme of Russia.57 Overall, they 
argue that Russia has pragmatic interests in the Arctic and is not interested in the Arctic 
militarization. Moreover, the militarization of the Arctic is unlikely to happen. 
 
Finally, there are works concerning the Arctic environment and science. Most of them 
chronologically appeared after the Cold War. They usually cover several issues such as 
general trends of the development of the Arctic science and the environment, the 
evaluation of the effectiveness of the existing Arctic institutions in resolving existing 
environmental problems. In addition, they propose certain measures to improve the 
present situation. Among scientists exploring the mentioned issues, the following 
researchers can be named Clive Archer, Oran Young, Olav Stokke and David Screvener.58 
 
In most research, the environment and science are regarded as most expected spheres of 
states’ cooperation. However, Clive Archer emphasizes that the level of such 
collaboration is defined by the utility of the outcome. He forecasts the great level of 
cooperation in the field of producing knowledge-instrumental outcome i. e. fundamental 
knowledge about nature and its processes, but does not anticipate high level of 
cooperation in the sphere of producing practical-instrumental outcome i.e. new 
                                                          
55 Piskunova 2010; Josephson 2014; Dugin 1991; Medvedev 2016 
56 Chilingarov 2013; Khramchikhin 2013; Heininen et al. 2014; Konyshev  and 
Sergunin 2014 
57 Konyshev  and Sergunin 2014 
58 Young 1985- 1986; Archer 1988; Stokke 1990; Screvener 1999 
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technologies, “know-how.” He believes that states will incline to keep the latest 
knowledge in secrecy. Thus, the works on the environment and science have both 
empirical and analytical significance. 
 
Afterwards, there is research devoted to the Arctic in general and Danish and Russian 
policies in the region separately. However, there is the absence of case studies examining 
Danish-Russian relations in the Arctic. This master’s thesis is an early attempt to explore 
the relationship of states of the Kingdom of Denmark and the Russian Federation through 
the lenses of the neo-realist school. I believe that my study will make its contribution to 
greater understanding of Danish and Russian Arctic policies in general and their relations 
to each other in particular.  
 
The mentioned research on the Arctic allowed me to identify general trends of states’ 
relations in the Arctic, their drivers and dynamics as well as the theoretical background 
of their investigation. 
 
 
Theoretical Framework 
 
As it was stated before, the main aim of this work is analyzing Danish and Russian foreign 
policies, in particular their policies towards each other in the Arctic region. In the present 
work, I perceive foreign policy, following the definition developed by Dereck Beach in 
his book Analyzing Foreign Policy: “Foreign policy is both the broad trends of behavior 
and the particular actions taken by a state or other collective actor as directed towards 
other collective actors within the international system. Foreign policy actions can be 
undertaken using a variety of different instruments, ranging from adopting declarations, 
making speeches, negotiating treaties, giving other state economic aid, engaging in 
diplomatic activity such as summits, and the use of military force.”59 
 
This definition presents a broad concept of foreign policy including both the verbalized 
and non-verbalized foreign policy. I consider that the employment of the broad definition 
of the foreign policy will contribute more into the creation of complete picture of Danish-
                                                          
59 Beach 2012, 3 
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Russian relations by bringing to analysis both their declared and undeclared intentions of 
two states.  
 
Guided by the title of my work, my thesis is going to be state-centric that corresponds to 
the neo-realist school.60 I believe that states and their interests play the main roles when 
it comes to the Arctic, since this region with a great share of natural resources has unique 
complex environmental challenges and demands for huge financial, management 
investments and binding global regulations, which can be provided only by such large 
actors as states.  
 
Thus, the neo-realist system level theory is intended to be a grand explanatory theoretical 
strand employed in my research. According to the neo-realism, the base of the 
international organization is an archaic system of states.61 Within this system, the states 
“at a minimum seek their own preservation and a maximum, drive for universal 
domination.”62 Hence, survival is the most basic foreign policy target.63  To guarantee its 
survival, states are interested in enhancing their power capabilities and relative gains. 
Power capabilities include population, territory, resources endowment, economical 
capabilities, military strength, political stability and competence.64 This preposition is 
vital for understanding the main drivers of Danish and Russian Arctic policies. 
  
Reviewing states as the main actors of the international organizations, proponents of the 
neo-realist school believe that goals of state’s foreign policy are settled by its position in 
the international system and its relative power capabilities.65 
 
In terms of power capabilities and the degree of exercising influence on the International 
System, states are classified as small, great and super great powers66. Following this 
classification, in my work Denmark is classified as a small power, meanwhile Russia as 
a great power in the international system. 
                                                          
60 Waltz 1979, 89-91 
61 Knutsen 1997, 277 
62 Waltz 1979, 37 
63 Mearsheimer 2001 
64 Ibid, 131 
65 Murray and Nuttall 2014, 38 
66 Vital 1967; Keohane 1988, 295-6 
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Neorealism, in its turn, expects the global level to play the most significant role in the 
determining of the state behavior in the international system, especially in the case of the 
small state.67 The global level is defined as the interaction between super/great powers. 68 
This assumption leads to the careful examination of the relations between super/great 
powers at the global level, and particularly, relations between Russia as a great power and 
the US as a superpower concerning the Arctic, since they will primarily determine 
Danish-Russian relations in the Arctic. 
 
Following the neorealist view, the role of small states in international politics is highly 
restricted, since small states are mainly “pawns” in great power games.69 Therefore, they 
endeavor to rely on a super/great power for security and goods, if small states are 
strategically important in the eyes of super/great powers; otherwise, small states lacking 
strategic relevance will have less opportunities for maneuver and extremely depend on 
the mercy of super/great powers.70  
 
Stephen Walt highlights two principle strategies that states can stick to while building 
ally bonds with other states.71 They can do it either by balancing through joining other 
states to counterbalance a stronger power or bandwagoning through joining an alliance 
with the stronger power. Meanwhile, with regard to small states, Walt underlines the main 
driver of state behavior, which is identified as the extent of threat a small state experiences 
in face of great/super great powers.72 
 
Danish NATO membership is explicit evidence of this statement. Denmark declares itself 
as the US prominent ally and reaffirms its undisputed commitment to NATO, calling 
NATO the main pillar of its security policy.73 Here is the witness of bandwagoning, as 
the US is no doubt a superpower.  
                                                          
67 Waltz 1979, 184-5, 195; Mathisen 1971; Rosenau  1966; Handel 1981; Bjol 1971; 
Branner 2000 
68 Knudsen 1994, 202 
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70 Ibid 
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Hence, the implementation on neo-realist school seems to be justified within the scope of 
this work. This assumption leads to reviewing Danish relations with the US in the context 
of Danish Arctic policy as another way to plump its strategical significance in the eyes of 
the US to secure itself and its influence on Danish Arctic policy. 
 
Another neo-realist assumption is that a small state, situated next to great/super great 
powers is extremely vulnerable to great shocks at the global level and extremely interested 
in the absence of conflicts between super/great powers as in this case they are supposed 
to be overwhelmed.74 This suggestion leads to the assumption that Denmark being a small 
state can be willing to mediate relations between great/super great powers, more 
specifically the US and Russia, and foster cooperation among all states to secure its 
position and obtain its gains in the Arctic. 
 
Apart from neo-realist school, the theoretical background of my study incorporates the 
theory of geopolitics as it is best equipped with concepts relevant to my thesis, i.e. 
geography and international relations. The term geopolitics is defined as the dynamic 
prominence of how a geographical space interacts with international politics. 75 In other 
words, the proponents of geopolitics state that geography matters within the IR. The focus 
of geopolitics is interaction between states in view of the attractiveness of a certain 
geographical area. As stated by geopolitics researchers, certain regions draw special 
states’ attention if they are rich in resources and strategically important in terms of 
communications.76 The Arctic as a large territory with its vast share of petroleum, bio, 
mineral resources and its increasing accessibility to the new sea trade routes complies 
with this fundamental criteria. Therefore, geopolitics is extremely suitable for 
understanding Danish-Russian relations in the Arctic. 
 
Another preposition made by geopolitics thinkers is that geographical proximity 
determines more contacts between states.77 The development of such Arctic regional 
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75 Cohen 2009, 12 
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organizations as the Arctic Council, Northern Dimension and the Euro-Barents Council 
fits this assumption. 
 
Finally, one of the main pillars of geopolitics is considering geopolitical significance of 
the given area as a changeable variable, which is true for the Arctic case.78 Prior the World 
War II, the Arctic was a marginalizing area. It was no more than remote, unexplored space 
with severe living conditions. During the World War II and especially the Cold War, the 
Arctic acquired its military significance due to its strategical location between assertive 
powers.79 The Arctic was a highly militarized and conflict region. 80   
 
The next turn in the geopolitical value of the Arctic took place in 1987 when Mikhail 
Gorbachev proclaimed the course on the Arctic demilitarization and set the environmental 
issues as the main features determining the Arctic global policy. Following this intention, 
the Arctic was defined as a region of cooperation. 81 
 
Meanwhile, the climate change with following ice melting and opening of the new sea 
routes as well as the detection of rich oil and gas deposits in the Arctic has dramatically 
changed the geopolitical value of the Arctic. This change was symbolically marked by 
the planting of the Russian Flag in the Arctic seabed by the head of Russian Arctic 
Scientific Expedition Mr. Chilingarov in 2007.82 That, in its turn, triggered the immediate 
reaction of other states and brought the Arctic to the top of agenda in IR. In my work, I 
expect that the changeable geopolitical value of the Arctic will determine Danish-Russian 
economic relations at great extent. 
 
 
Outlines of the thesis 
 
Guided by the research aim, I have organized my thesis in the following order: 
introduction, six chapters and conclusion. I believe this structure to be reasonable as it 
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reflects the necessary analysis in order to answer the mentioned above research questions 
and achieve the main research goal. 
 
The first and second chapters feature Danish and Russian interests in the Arctic, analyze 
the main drivers of both states in the region. I consider them invaluable for understanding 
their policies on the ground.  
 
The third chapter addresses the issues of the Arctic governance and reflects on its multi-
layer structure. Moreover, this chapter presents comparative analysis of Danish and 
Russian visions of the Arctic governance, in particular. In this chapter, I trace the Arctic 
territories claim process of two states that sheds light on Danish and Russian incentives 
to cooperate rather than confront over resolving the question of disputable areas.  
 
The fourth, fifth and sixth chapters are intended to examine the nature of Danish-Russian 
relations in specific areas, such as economy that is presented in particular sections (i.e. 
oil and gas sector, shipping, shipbuilding, fishery, energy, tourism), military sector as 
well as scientific and environmental areas. These chapters by means of applying selected 
methods of research present the overall nature as well as the main trends, drivers and 
obstacles in each sector of bilateral relations of Denmark and Russia. In this part of the 
thesis, I also offer a thorough investigation of the direct and indirect implications of 
Danish-Russian cooperation and influence of great/super great powers on the decision-
making process of Denmark and Russia in different areas of relations.  
        
In general, throughout the entire thesis, I construct my analysis on the theories presented 
in Introduction, i.e. geopolitics and neo-realism that are best suitable for explanation 
Danish-Russian bilateral relations as well as multilateral actions that are driven by global 
thinking of both states in terms of their place in the world political system. Meanwhile, 
selected research methods allow me to represent the object of research in its entirety and 
versatility. 
 
In Conclusion, I summarize the thesis and reflect on areas of future research. In addition, 
I give my vision of future scenario of Danish-Russian relations in the Arctic based on the 
performed analysis. 
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Definitions 
 
In my work the Arctic is defined as “the terrestrial and marine areas north of the Arctic 
Circle (66°32'N), and north of 62°N in Asia and 60°N in North America, modified to 
include the marine areas north of the Aleutian chain, Hudson Bay, and parts of the North 
Atlantic Ocean including the Labrador Sea”.83  
 
 
Figure 7. Boundaries of the Arctic (AMAP n. d.) 
 
This definition determines the Arctic status of eight states. They are five Arctic coastal 
states, known as “Arctic Five” (Denmark, Russia, the USA, Canada, Norway) and three 
Arctic non-coastal states, which territories are intersected by the Arctic Circle (Finland, 
Sweden, Iceland).  Together they make a group, known as “Arctic Eight”. These states 
alongside with six Arctic indigenous communities are the permanent members of the 
Arctic Council – an  intergovernmental forum fostering collaboration, coordination and 
interaction among the Arctic States, indigenous organizations, thirteen non-governmental 
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organizations and thirteen non-Arctic states as observers, on issues of sustainable 
development and environmental protection in the Arctic.84  
 
As my work is state centric, it is reasonable to give definitions of what is implied by 
Denmark and the Russian Federation. This is of great importance, as the Kingdom of 
Denmark cannot be equaled to the notion of Denmark without considerations.  
 
In my study, the term Denmark substitutes the Kingdom of Denmark, which is referred 
as a constitutional entity including Denmark, autonomous parts of Greenland and the 
Faroe Islands, whereas Greenland and the Faroe Islands are not EU members.85 However, 
in Chapters 1 and 4 the term Denmark refers to the Danish government, this 
differentiation is determined by the necessity to describe relations between constitutional 
entities in the Kingdom and their influence on the Kingdom’s Arctic Policy. 
 
Figure 8. Denmark (Source: VektorStock n.d.) 
The Kingdom of Denmark is a constitution monarchy.86 The Kingdom’s population is 
about 5.8 million of people.87 Denmark is one of the most prosperous countries in the 
world and one of the leading countries in the innovation development.88 Denmark’s 
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economy is export-orientated.89 According to the Global Competitive Index of countries’ 
economies Denmark occupies the 12th position out of 137 for the period 2017-2018.90 The 
Kingdom of Denmark is a proactive member of NATO.91 For 2019, Denmark has 51st 
position in terms of its military capabilities.92 The country is a member of such the Arctic 
international organizations as the Arctic Council, the Euro-Barents Cooperation and the 
Northern Dimension.93 The Kingdom has four opt-outs from the EU cooperation.94 In this 
research, Danish opt-out of EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is relevant 
in analyzing Danish-Russian military relations in the Arctic.  
 
The term Russia stands for the Russian Federation, the largest country in the world, 
located in Eastern Europe and Northern Asia and washed by the waters of the Pacific and 
Arctic Oceans.95 The Russian Federation is a Presidential (or a Constitutional) republic.96 
The structure of the Russian Federation includes 85 subjects with different levels of 
autonomy. 97The Russian population is about 145 million of people.98 According to the 
Global Competitive Index of countries’ Russia occupies the 38th position out of 137 for 
the period 2017-2018.99 Russia is an export-orientated economy with natural resources in 
its core.100 For 2019, Russia possesses the 2nd position in terms of its military capacities 
yielding to the US.101 The country is a member of the Arctic Council, the Euro-Barents 
Cooperation and the Northern Dimension.102 
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Figure 9. The Russian Federation (Source: OnTheWorldMap n. d.) 
 
Another definition, which is crucial for understanding Danish-Russian relations in the 
Arctic, is governance. The relations of the Kingdom of Denmark and the Russian 
Federation in terms of the Arctic governance are presented in Chapter 3.  
 
In Chapter 3, I employ the broad definition of “governance” suggested by Oliver 
Williamson. According to Williamson, “governance” correlates to any form of 
establishing or maintaining political order and providing common goods for a given 
political community on any level.103  
 
Process of data collection 
 
Due to the limited works on the topic of my thesis, one of the challengeable tasks in my 
research was to collect empirical data on Danish-Russian relations in general and in the 
Arctic in particular to base my analysis on. This way of thinking led me to investigating 
a broad range of primary sources. During the process of data collection, I used the desktop 
(Internet) research technique. The value of my work is enshrined in careful study of 
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sources in Danish and Russian that provide a researcher with the internal perspective of 
the relations of two states in the Arctic.  
 
This research question is approached through a thorough qualitative document analysis 
of laws, declarations, reports and publications from relevant governments, non-
governmental organizations, research institutes, corporations and media with interest in 
Danish-Russian relations in the Arctic, in particular, and the Arctic development in 
general.  
 
All sources employed in my work can be divided into eight groups. Altogether, they help 
me approach the research question from different angles in order to present the complex 
nature of the relations of two states in the region. 
 
The first group of sources includes laws, strategies and concepts adopted by Danish and 
Russian authorities. They are the most important sources employed in my work.  
 
It is hard to imagine analyzing Danish-Russian relations in the Arctic without attracting 
Danish and Russian Arctic Strategies. These strategies are crucial for defining Danish 
and Russian Arctic policies. They provide the states’ visions of the region both in the 
global and national contexts. Exploring the strategies, one can find the main Danish and 
Russian endeavors in the Arctic. 
 
It is also vital to explore the states’ military strategies as well as foreign concepts. The 
analysis of these documents leads to the comprehensive understanding of Danish and 
Russian military policies in the Arctic both separately and in relation to each other.  
 
It is also crucial to study the states’ laws and strategies concerning different fields of the 
economy such as oil and gas exploitation, fishery, shipping, shipbuilding, tourism etc. 
The exploration of these materials gives insights into the main trends of Danish and 
Russian economy policies in general and in the Arctic in particular. 
 
The second group of sources encompasses international agreements i.e. bilateral and 
multilateral agreements. Such multilateral agreements as the Ilulissat Declaration and the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea are extremely important for 
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understanding the current Arctic governance and Arctic states’ vision of this governance. 
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea is particular important for 
explaining Danish and Russian territorial claims in the region. The agreements signed by 
the Arctic states are especially significant for exploring Danish-Russian relations in terms 
of the environment (Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness 
and Response in the Arctic), military issue (Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical 
and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic), science (Agreement on International 
Science Cooperation) and economy (Agreement between Arctic five on the Prevention of 
Unregulated High Seas Fishing in the Central Arctic). The Danish-Russian bilateral 
agreements provide information on Danish-Russian cooperation in such fields as 
economy and science. 
 
The third group of sources comprises reports of governmental organizations. Official 
reports and reviews primarily provide information on economic and military facets of 
Danish-Russian relations in the Arctic. The surveys published by such Danish agencies 
as Danish Defence Intelligence Service and Danish Ministry of Defence are important for 
analyzing Danish stance on military affairs in the Arctic. At the same time, reports and 
analysis published by Danish Maritime Authority covers economic opportunities and 
challenges set before Denmark in the Arctic, generally in the maritime industry. 
Regarding Russian sources of this category, one should point out the data presented by 
the Trade Representation of the Russian Federation in the Kingdom of Denmark 
employed for better understanding of the general context of Danish-Russian relations in 
terms of economy.  
 
Meanwhile, Denmark and Russia are not the only states official reports of which are used 
in the thesis. The reports published by governmental agencies of other states such as the 
US, Great Britain and Finland are incorporated in my research, too. The information 
provided by the US Geology Service and the US Energy Information Administration is 
specifically important for exploration the economic drivers of Danish and Russian Arctic 
policies. In its turn, the data presented by the US Coast Guard on the world icebreaker 
fleet is significant for analyzing Arctic states’ both military and economic capabilities in 
the region. 
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The report by the British House of Commons “On the Thin Ice: UK Defence in the Arctic” 
is valuable for elaboration Danish-Russian relations in military terms. The report is a 
comprehensive analysis of military situation in the Arctic based on official evidence and 
statements of Great Britain and the Arctic States. In particular, the report includes a 
written evidence on the Arctic military issue sent by the Kingdom of Denmark to the UK. 
This evidence is essential to determine the attitude of Danish authorities to the Russian 
military activities in the region and possible NATO’s further increasing involvement into 
the Arctic affairs. 
 
The report by the Finish Border Guard is also very helpful for collecting empirical data 
on operative cooperation of Danish and Russian armed forces. This report reflects the 
main activities carried out under Finland’s chairmanship in the Arctic Coast Guard Forum 
(2017-2019). 
 
The fourth group of sources includes the reports of international organizations such as 
NATO Parliamentary Assembly, the European Environment Agency and the Arctic 
Council. NATO’s Annual Presidential Report covers NATO’s position in the Arctic, its 
views on the Arctic military architecture, while the European Environment Agency and 
the Arctic Council’s reports concern the environment issue in the region. 
 
The fifth group of sources encompasses the reports of non-governmental organizations. 
They primarily focus on the indicators of Danish and Russian economies. They are 
rankings and economic reports published by the World Bank, Bloomberg, IMD World 
Competitiveness Center, OEC (The Observatory of Economic Complexity), Ernst 
&Young, the Legatum Prosperity Institute, the Transparency International, the Lonely 
Planet, GFP (Global Fire Power). Their data is employed for exploration Danish-Russian 
relations in terms of economy. 
 
The sixth group of sources consists of speeches and addresses of Danish and Russian 
politicians and officials. The speeches and addresses of the Russian President Vladimir 
Putin, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergej Lavrov and the head of the Russian 
State Commission for the Arctic, Dmitrij Rogozin (2015-2018), at the Annual 
International Arctic Forums held in Russia as well as at the government’s meetings are 
extremely significant for exploration the Russian Arctic policy. These sources equip a 
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researcher with the information on all facets of the Russian Arctic policy: economy, 
military issue, the environment, governance and science. 
 
The addresses and discussions presented at the bilateral meetings of Danish and Russian 
authorities are particularly important for studying Danish-Russian relations in the Arctic. 
The explicit examples of such meetings are mutual official visits of Danish and Russian 
Foreign Ministers in 2008 and 2009, and the meeting of the Russian President Dmitrij 
Medvedev (2008-2012) and the Danish Prime Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen (2009-
2011) within Russian-Danish Business Conference in 2010. 
 
The seventh group of sources includes mass media. In my work, I use following Danish, 
Russian and other relevant foreign mass media sources: 
 information agencies (RT Reuters, InterFax, RIA NOVOSTI, Sputnik, TASS, 
Novosti Jenergetiki, ROSBALT ) 
  TV/Internet channels (BBC, CNBC, 1tv. ru, Vesti.ru, TvZvezda.ru, Youtube) 
  newspapers (Politiken, Berlingske, Nyheder, the Telegraph, the Guardian, the 
Times, the Economist, Welt, Gazeta, EUObserver, Vedomosti, Izvestija IZ,  
Komsomol'skaja pravda, Vzgljad, Today, RBK, Kommersant) 
 magazines and news websites (EURACTIVE, Korabel.Ru, PortNews, SeaNews, 
ShippingWatch, World Maritime News, Offshore Energy Today, Energy-Pedia 
News, Utime News, Bloomberg, Arctic Today, FishNews, Ollprice.com, 
SeafoodSource, Republic, Stroitelnyj vestnik, S.O.K., Siliconrepublic, Polpred, 
UCN Undercurrent News, Stars and Stripes, Armejskij Vestnik, Polit.Ru) 
 
 
The presented materials cover different fields of Danish and Russian Arctic policies as 
well as Danish-Russian relations as the whole. Meanwhile, interviews and comments 
given by Danish, Russian and other relevant foreign officials, scientists and 
representatives of business companies to mass media are especially important as they 
provide the first-hand information on the topic. The analysis of it sheds the light on 
practical and theoretical perspectives of the research question.  
 
Among mentioned above, there should be noted the interviews and comments given by: 
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 the Danish Foreign Minister Lene Espersen (2010-2011)  
 the Danish Minister of Defence Gitte Lillehund Bech (2010-2011)  
 the Danish Foreign Minister Martin Lidegaard (2014-2015)  
 the Danish Foreign Minister Anders Samuelsen (2016-2019)  
 the Russian Permanent Representative to NATO, Aleksandr Grushko (2012-
2018) 
 the Deputy Prime Minister of Russia’s Defence and Space Industry, Jurij.Borisov 
(2018 – present) 
 the Minister of Natural Resources and Environment of the Russian Federation, 
Sergej Donskoi (2012-2018) 
 the Russian Minister of Energy, Aleksandr Novak (2012-present) 
 the Ambassador for Special Assignments of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
Russian Federation, the Representative of the Russian Federation to the Arctic 
Council, Anton Vasil'ev 
  the Russian Defence Minister, Sergej Shojgu (2012-current) 
 NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg (2014-present), 
 NATO Deputy Secretary General Ambassador Aleksandr Vershbow (2012-2016) 
 United States Special Representative for the Arctic,       Admiral Robert J. Papp 
Jr.  (2014-2017) 
 the US Ambassador to Russia, John F. Tefft (2014-2017) 
 
They are extremely useful for understanding Russian military and economic policies in 
the Arctic.  
 
Speaking on the interviews and comments by the Russian and Danish scientists, the full 
interview with the Coordinator of scientific work on the preparation of the Russian 
territorial claim in the Arctic, Leopol’d Lobkovskij, demands special attention. This 
interview is vital for analysis of Danish-Russian relations in terms of Arctic governance 
in general, and territorial claims in particular. In contrast to the current mainstream 
existing in mass media, portraying Danish and Russian claims with a tint of their 
inherently adversary “competitive” nature, Leopol’d Lobkovskij provides the scientific 
account of the Danish and Russian applications to the United Nations Commission on the 
Limits and the Continental Shelf. His interview gives insights on cooperative nature of 
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presented claims. The comments provided by Kristian Markusen, chief Advisor at 
geological surveys of Denmark and Greenland (GEUS) in 2010, also give insights on 
Danish-Russian cooperation in this field. 
 
The interviews and comments by the representative of private and state owned companies 
are also relevant for my study. The interviews and comments by  chief executive officer 
(CEO) of Rosatom Aleksej Lihachjov and its deputy Vjacheslav Ruksha,  chief-executive 
officer of Rosneft  Igor' Sechin, Maersk’s chief technical officer,  Palle Laursen and  CEO 
of the Russian headquarter of the Dansih company Danfoss, Mikhail Shapiro provide 
information on economic facet of Danish-Russian relations in the Arctic.  
 
The eighth group comprises information presented on the websites. In my study, I employ 
websites of governmental organizations, international and non-governmental 
organizations. The list of websites is presented below. The full list is in the list of 
references. 
 Websites of governmental organizations (Danish Ministry of Defence,  Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation,  Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Denmark, Embassy of the Russian Federation in the Kingdom of Denmark, 
Federal Agency for Fishery of the Russian Federation, Russian Federal Agency 
for Tourism, FOLKETINGET EU Information Centre, FOLKETINGET The 
Danish Parliament, Government of Greenland, Ministry of Higher Education and 
Science of the Kingdom of Denmark, President of Russia, The Russian 
Government, U. S. Department of State, , Danish Ministry of Energy, Utilities and 
Climate, The Northern Sea Route Administration, websites of state’s universities 
etc.) 
 Websites of international organizations (Arctic Council, The Arctic Economic 
Council (AEC), Barents Euro-Arctic Cooperation, NASA, European Council, 
European Union, Exploring the Northern Dimension, Nordic Defence 
Cooperation, NATO, The Arctic Coast Guard Forum (ACGF), UN Environment, 
United Nations: Oceans and Law of the Sea, Sustaining Arctic Observing System 
(SAON), International Maritime Organization (IMO), International Arctic 
Science Committee, University of the Arctic (UArctic) etc.) 
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 Websites of non-governmental organizations (Danfoss, Gazprom, NORDIC Bulk 
Carrier A/S, NOVATEK, ROSATOM, ROSENERGOATOM, Russian 
Investment Agency, Russian-Danish Business Forum, SKSkolkovo, National 
Tourist Union, Akcionernoe obshhestvo MNS etc.) 
 
To sum up, the source foundation is vital for presenting reliable empirical data of Danish-
Russian relations in the Arctic both for past and present. The factual back - up of my work 
provided me with the necessary information to construct prognosis of such relations in 
future. 
 
 
Methods 
 
My work has a qualitative character since it creates non-numerical data.104 In contrast to 
a quantitative study, a qualitative research includes a data collection and interpretation 
process with accents on descriptions and explanation, which is necessary to identify the 
main trends and drivers in Danish-Russian relations that are the basic aim of my thesis.  
Steinar Kvale considers a qualitative research as especially valuable in the process of 
investigating a particular topic burdened with complexity.105 To fulfill the tasks of my 
thesis, the following methodological tools are employed: comparative analysis, case study 
analysis and process tracing analysis. I apply each method as supplementary one to 
another. This approach is justified by complex nature of the research topic with 
intertwined factors determining its characteristics. 
 
Considering Danish-Russian relations, I cannot dispense with comparative analysis that 
is a solid foundation on which I build the system of arguments in order to detect the areas 
of common and conflicting interests of both states in the Arctic. Comparative analysis is 
a powerful and universal tool that expands the possibilities of understanding and 
describing political processes and changes in accordance with the existing reality, 
concepts and goals. I rely on comparative analysis throughout the entire thesis. Though 
the aim of the thesis is highlighting the main trends and drivers in Danish-Russian 
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relations rather than comparing the states’ policies in the Arctic, the competitive edge of 
comparative analysis as a whole is enshrined in its capacity to introduce diverse 
environment of decision-making process both in Denmark and Russia that can explain 
their motives in various sections of cooperation. 
 
In turn, following Yin, case study analysis equips a researcher with required tools to 
explore a phenomenon within its real-time context.106 This assumption is certainly 
relevant for this study. Case study analysis is of great use in exploring current state of 
affairs in each particular sector of cooperation of Denmark and Russia, presented in 
chapters 4, 5 and 6. Also, I consider case study analysis favorable for revealing disputable 
territories claim process between Denmark and Russia in Chapter 3 as a good case of the 
Arctic governance on bilateral basis by applying not only national tools but also 
multilateral platforms as the Arctic Council to fulfill national interests. This 
argumentation fits neo-realism theoretical boundaries.  
 
Finally, process-tracing analysis is the most appropriate research technique for 
identifying cause-effect mechanisms within a particular case. This method is embodied 
at less or great extent in each chapter to understand dynamics of Danish-Russian relations 
in the Arctic with necessary retrospective view to interpret outcomes of Danish-Russian 
interaction on the Arctic issues at a particular point. This method is complementary to 
comparative analysis and enables generalizations of observations from single case studies 
to similar cases.  
 
Considering the problematic of present research, I find these methods the most suitable 
for illustrating the research question from different angles, revealing Danish-Russian 
relations dynamics, explaining the main trends and drivers within their relations 
concerning the Arctic issues. 
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I. DANISH INTERESTS IN THE ARCTIC 
 
The kingdom of Denmark has its Arctic status due to the location of Greenland (the 
biggest island in the Arctic region) which is a part of the Kingdom.107 At the same time, 
the position of Greenland in the Kingdom of Denmark is specific. It is an autonomous 
part with lots of prerogatives. Following the prepositions of constitutional arrangement, 
the Act on Greenland Self-Government adopted in 2009, Greenland has the right to elect 
its own parliament and government.108 It exercises sovereignty and administration over 
such areas as the environment, health, fishery, education, utilizing natural resources and 
climate.109 Meanwhile, the Danish government reserves its jurisdiction over such areas as 
justice affairs, security policy, foreign policy, financial policy and civil right law. 110 
 
Most significantly, the constitutional agreement also provides Greenland with the 
procedure to get independence.111 It is the possibility of Greenland’s independence that 
could threaten the Danish position in the Arctic.112 The idea of independence has a bunch 
of proponents in Greenland.113 The Danish government is highly interested in weakening 
the independence movements in Greenland.114 To ensure the Greenland’s presence within 
the Kingdom of Denmark, the Danish government is taking several measures.  
 
Firstly, Denmark provides Greenland with substantial financial aid. Greenland’s 
economy primarily relies on the Danish annual block grant of 3.5 billion Danish kroners 
that accounts for more than 50% of Greenland’s government revenues, and 25% of 
GDP.115 To zero out the annual Danish subsidiary, Greenland needs to develop dozens of 
mines, oil and gas deposits.116 According to the US Geology Service appraisal from 2008, 
                                                          
107 Jacobsen  2016  
108 Government of Greenland n. d. (a) 
109 Ibid 
110 Ibid 
111 Ibid 
112 Mouritzen, Hans. 2018, 127 
113 Kirk 2018; Musaddique  2018 
114 Rahbek-Clemmensen  2011, 1-2 
115 Ibid;  Index Mundi 2018 (a); Government of Greenland 2009 
116 Jacobsen 2016 
35 
 
the Greenland’s basin is expected to contain approximately 17 billion barrels of oil and 
138.000 billion cubic feet of natural gas.117  
 
However, to exploit these resources Greenland needs great investments and management 
skills that cannot be provided by Greenland itself. Since 1970 great investments by such 
companies as Dong, Exon mobile, Statoil, Husky, Chevron and Cairn Energy have been 
allocated into the exploration of Greenland’s oil and gas deposits118. Still, these 
explorations have not given any tangible results, no great oil and gas deposits have been 
discovered.119 Taking into account the current tendency of low oil prices, it seems 
challengeable for Greenland to attract new investments in the exploration. 120 
 
It is worth mentioning that the Danish government enjoying its administrative capacity 
plays an active role in attracting of such investments, promoting Greenland‘s interests in 
the international economic forums and meetings. For instance, in March 2019, the Danish 
Crown Prince Frederik headed a large Danish business delegation that traveled to Canada 
to present Greenland as an attractive destination for mining companies to run business. 
Denmark’s minister for Energy, Utilities and Climate Lars Christian Lilleholt (2015-
present) also participated in the delegation.121 Therefore, Greenland is highly dependent 
on the Danish government both in terms of financial support and possible development 
of oil and gas deposits. In case of gaining independence from Denmark at present 
moment, Greenland will face the status of one of the poorest European nations.122 This 
economic dependence mainly predetermines Greenland’s presence in the Kingdom of 
Denmark.  
 
Secondly, Demark partly promotes involvement of Greenland’s authorities into the 
decision making process on foreign policy to insure Greenland in the accounting of its 
interests in exercising Kingdom‘s foreign policy.123 Particularly, it was done in the Arctic 
case, in which Greenland grasped an opportunity to elaborate Kingdom of Denmark's 
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strategy for the Arctic from 2011 to 2020 on an equal foundation.124 Following the words 
of former Danish foreign minister (2015-2016), Kristian Jensen, “This cooperation 
(cooperation with Greenland) makes us (the Kingdom of Denmark) greater in the 
world.”125 
  
Thirdly, the Danish authorities also encourage Greenland’s commitment to the security 
policy, particularly through the volunteer participation of the Greenland residents in the 
activities of the Danish armed forces deployed on the island of Greenland.126 
 
Finally, apart from political involvement and financial support the Danish government 
strengthens its sovereignty over Greenland by active engagement into the international 
Arctic governance. This development is twofold.  
 
On the one hand, Denmark boosted its political role in the Arctic governance to get 
“credentials” of its sovereignty over Greenland from other countries. Being an official 
contractor of legal binding agreements within the Arctic council, Denmark in existing 
constitutional framework is perceived by other states as a more convenient actor in the 
Arctic rather than Greenland. It is not a coincidence, that despite general Danish endeavor 
to promote Greenland’s involvement into the Arctic affairs, Greenland representatives 
have not taken part at the executive SAO meeting of the Arctic Council since 2011 and 
the sign at the table was changed from “Denmark, the Faroe Islands, and Greenland” to 
the Kingdom of Denmark. This act is another evidence of acknowledging the Kingdom 
of Denmark as the only actor in the Arctic issues.127  
 
On the other hand, Denmark’s commitment to the increasing engagement in the Arctic 
affairs aims to ensure Greenland’s economic interests providing its population with a 
wide range of necessary opportunities to gain all possible economical profits from the 
Arctic development. In accordance with this endeavor, the Kingdom of Denmark 
submitted a claim to the UN Commission on the Limits and the Continental Shelf for a 
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large area of the Arctic seabed, approximately 895.541 sq. km in 2014.128 This claim 
required enormous scientific research for 12 years and over 55 million dollars worth of 
investments.129 The clam is of great importance for Greenland, since in case of positive 
decision the claimed territory with its allpotential economic profits will become a part of 
Greenland anyway, even in case of independence from Denmark. 
 
Thus, the ensurance of Danish sovereignty over Greenland is one of the main concerns in 
Danish Arctic policy. The geographical position of Greenland in the Arctic region and 
Denmark’s authority over it is the only Denmark’s guarantee to impact the Arctic issues 
directly as an Arctic state. This is a true illustration of strong intertwining of geography 
matters with politics issues that can be easily integrated into the framework of geopolitics. 
 
What makes the Arctic, particularly Greenland, so essential in the eyes of Danish 
authorities? The proponents of the realistic school will immediately give the answer: it is 
territory and economic interest in the development of the Arctic natural resources. 
However, such great Danish investments into Greenland and strong commitment to the 
Arctic development are much more than just concern of the state territory expansion and 
getting future possible economic benefits.  
 
Greenland is extremely significant for Denmark in terms of its relationship with a super-
great power the US. The main reason for this is Greenland’s military importance to the 
US.130 Greenland is situated next to the halfway point between Moscow and New York 
City and has a perfect position for the US missiles strikes and interception of missiles 
flying over the North Pole.131 It is also crucial due to the so called Greenland-Iceland-
U.K. gap, where Russian submarines would operate in case of a military conflict.132 In 
fact, Denmark could use Greenland as a “bargaining chip” to foster its relationship with 
the US enhancing its status as a prominent ally.133 This position can be explained with 
Denmark’s nature as a small state134. According to the last adopted Danish Defence 
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Agreement, NATO is the main security pillar of the Kingdom of Denmark.135 Holding a 
“Greenland card”, particularly the placement of the American Thule Air Base with 
sophisticated Early Warning radar system in Greenland, Denmark for many years has 
been able to enjoy a discount on its NATO membership, paying less than 2% of GDP, 
which is NATO’s official defence spending target for member states. 136 
 
However, nowadays the “Greenland card” has a tendency to evolve into the “Arctic card” 
as it itself is getting less important.137 The military significance of Greenland is correlated 
with increasing possibility of a real military conflict between the US and Russia138. This 
correlation makes the “Greenland card” not very reliable, almost totally dependent on the 
nature of the US-Russia relations.139 Hence, Denmark is trying to pave new relevant paths 
to accommodate the US. 140 
 
One of these ways is lying through Danish active policy in the Arctic. The US as an Arctic 
State is expected to have an increasing interest in the region. Meanwhile, the Arctic is 
still a marginal area in the US foreign policy.141 Recent decision of Trump administration 
to relocate budget money allocated for modernization of the current modest Arctic 
icebreakers fleet to the Mexican border wall construction is a bright prove of low relevant 
significance of the Arctic in the present US policy.142  
 
At the same time, low significance at the moment does not imply low significance in 
future. It is not surprising given the fact of rapid ice melting and potential energy 
resources situated in the Arctic. This thesis is fully embraced by the Danish Government, 
which advocates its participation in the Arctic. One of the aims of Danish active 
involvement into the Arctic affairs is acquiring Arctic knowledge and experience that 
could be shared in future by the request of the US. 143 
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It is worth mentioning that alongside with using the “Arctic card” Denmark promotes its 
status in NATO by active engagement into NATO international operations.144 Thus, the 
Arctic commitment is one of the grand strategy elements of diversification of Danish 
means to strengthen its position as the US ally. 
 
Another driver of Danish Arctic policy is recognizing the Arctic as “a natural place” to 
restore diplomatic relations between the US and Russia.145 Being a small state between 
two super/great powers, Denmark is highly sensitive to political shocks at the global level 
and is interested in peaceful relations between great and super great powers, particularly 
between Russia and the US. In case of a possible US-Russia conflict, Denmark will be 
placed into a “hot spot” between two countries and risk to lose its control over Greenland 
and, consequently, one of its political attractiveness to the US. 146 
 
The decision-making process and governance model set in the Arctic, particularly within 
the Arctic Council, makes Denmark an equal peer of such great and super great powers 
as Russia and the US. This position allows Denmark to pursue its interests and employ 
legal tools to fully develop its agenda of promoting peaceful relations between great 
powers both through bilateral relations with the Arctic states and multilateral relations 
within the Arctic Council. 
 
The main principles of Danish Arctic policy have been formulated in the Kingdom’s 
Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020.147 According to the Danish Arctic Strategy, the 
Kingdom sets the following aims: peaceful, secure and safe Arctic; sustainable 
exploitation of natural resources; maintaining and enhancing Greenland’s development 
as an “equal partner” towards increasing autonomy; obtaining the status of one of the 
major players in the Arctic affairs; cooperation with other states in the field of the climate 
change, maritime safety and indigenous people.148 
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Apart from the adoption of the Arctic Strategy, the Danish government established the 
administrative resources to help manage the strategy realization. In 2012, the Danish 
Foreign Minister’s “office for the Arctic and North America” was set up.149 In the same 
year, the Senior Arctic official was granted the rank of the “Arctic ambassador”150.  
 
Afterwards, the main driver of the Danish Arctic policy is enhancing its sovereignty over 
Greenland. Greenland is in the heart of Denmark’s overall strategy in exploring and 
developing the Arctic region that, by some estimates, is considered profitable in terms of 
future economic gains from exploration of Arctic natural resources as well as new sea 
routes. This state of affairs specifies Danish intentions to keep Greenland in. Moreover, 
Danish interests in the Arctic are supplemented by the desire to boost its geopolitical 
weight through accommodating its super power ally, the US, and pursuing avoidance of 
political conflicts between great and super great powers, mainly the US and Russia.  
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II. RUSSIAN INTERESTS IN THE ARCTIC 
 
Russia possesses a unique geopolitical position in the Arctic due to the fact that it has 
more than half of the Arctic territory where, according to the US Geology Service, the 
biggest share of all undiscovered hydrocarbon resources (approximately 90 billion barrels 
of oil, 1.669 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, and 44 billion barrels of natural gas liquids) 
is stored.151 
 
Russia’s Arctic is the most populated and developed from an industrial perspective part 
of the Arctic.152 Russia is a country with the largest icebreakers fleet in the world.153 It is 
a permanent and active member of the Arctic Council.154 It is also a state with the greatest 
investments into the development of its Arctic infrastructure.155 Therefore, it is difficult 
to imagine the decision-making process in the Arctic without Russian involvement. The 
Danish researcher, Hans Mouritzen, even calls Russia as a superpower in the region in 
terms of population, territory and infrastructure.156  
 
 
In turn, the Arctic is vital for Russia. Following the words of the Russian President 
Vladimir Putin, the Arctic plays an important role in the Russian economy.157 It accounts 
for 22% of total volume of the Russian export revenue, about 11% of GDP, 15% of total 
volume of Russian fishing production and a plenty of mineral resources.158 Its mining 
industries provide primary and placer diamond (99% of total Russian production), 
platinum-group elements (PGE) (98%), nickel and cobalt (over 90%), chromium and 
manganese (90%), copper (60%), antimony, tin, tungsten, and rare metals (from 50 to 
90%), and gold. 50% of all Russian hydrocarbon is located in the Arctic.159 This region 
of Russia is the most prolific producer of Russian gas (85%) and oil (about 13%)160. 
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According to the Report of the Russian Ministry of Emergencies, the total cost of the 
natural resources deployed in the Russian Arctic is more than 30 trillion dollars. 161 
 
Apart from natural resources and bio-resources, the Arctic provides Russia with more 
accessible trade route – the NSR, which is the shortest sea route between Asia and Europe. 
The route is approximately 3.9 thousand nautical miles or 34% shorter compared to the 
route via the Suez Canal, which reduces the travel time from 33 days to 20 days 
accordingly.162 This route is promised to be a real alternative to the Suez Route. Russia 
sees the future of the NSR as an international transport artery capable of competing with 
traditional sea lines in terms of the cost of services, security and quality.163 The 
development of the NSR is also expected to promote the Russian shipbuilding.164 More 
than that, Russia is extremely interested in the development of all unexploited oil and gas 
deposits in the Arctic, particularly by using the NSR as the way of transporting resources 
got from these deposits.165   
 
This interest is mainly determined by the fact that, following scientific forecasts, the 
existing on-land oil deposits situated in other parts of Russia are going to be depleted in 
30-50 years.166 Being a country which economy is primarily based on the export of natural 
resources, the dwelling of existing oil deposits presents a great threat to the Russian 
national interests, particularly to its economic position in the world.167 So, the 
development of the Arctic deposits, to be specific, off-shore deposits, is considered by 
Russian authorities as the natural way to substitute the exhausting currently developed oil 
and gas deposits.  
 
However, Russia does not have sufficient financial, technic and qualified human 
resources at its disposal to develop all possible oil and gas deposits and the NSR itself.168 
To gain economic profits from the Arctic, Russia is in need of great investments and 
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peaceful surrounding. With this in mind, Russia is interested in cooperation within the 
Arctic as cooperation can bring prosperity to Russia.169 
 
Apart from economic interest, the Arctic has great military significance for Russia. Such 
characteristics as the direct access to the Atlantic Ocean; its relative proximity to potential 
targets of missile and air defence as the shortest air ways from the North America to 
Eurasia lie through the Arctic, and an array of important defence industry and 
infrastructure facilities located in the Arctic – make the Arctic an appropriate spot for 
strategic naval operations. 170 
 
The strategic importance of the North is also connected to the sea-based nuclear forces 
deployed in the Arctic. Russia’s nuclear forces are vital not only for its security policy 
and military strategy, but also for Russia’s great power status.171 
 
Realizing the importance of the Arctic, The Russian Federation was among the first Arctic 
states to formulate the Arctic strategy in 2008 “The Foundations of the State Policy of the 
Russian Federation in the Arctic to 2020 and beyond”.172 In this strategy, the grand aim 
to “maintain the role of a leading Arctic power” was proclaimed.173 On February 20, 2013, 
the Strategy for the Development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation to 2020 
was approved by President Vladimir Putin, which revised and updated Strategy-2008.174 
Both documents set the following goals: developing the Arctic resources; turning the NSR 
into a unified national transport corridor and line of communication; maintaining the 
region as a zone of international cooperation and improvement the quality of life of 
indigenous people.175 The new Strategy for the Development of the Arctic Zone of the 
Russian Federation to 2035 is to be adopted in 2019.176  
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Like its Danish counterpart, Russia established the specific body to regulate the issues 
concerning the Arctic and its development. In 2015, the State Commission for the Arctic 
was set up, that was substituted in 2019 by Ministry of the Russian Federation for the 
Development of the Far East and the Arctic 177 
 
Hence, Russian main drivers in the Arctic policy are its economic, military and the 
following geopolitical gains. However, these expecting gains make Russia search for 
cooperation, as Russia cannot accumulate these profits only by fulfilling its own capacity.  
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III. DANISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS IN TERMS OF THE ARCTIC GOVERNANCE  
 
Nowadays, the Arctic governance has a multi-layer structure. At the global level, 
international conventions regulate the environmental issues, such as the protection of 
biodiversity and maritime ecosystems.178 At the regional level, the Arctic Council—
consisting of 8 Arctic states (Denmark, Norway, Canada, Russia, the USA, Finland, 
Sweeden, Iceland), 6 indigenous organizations as permanent participants, and 13 non-
Arctic states and 13 intergovernmental, inter-parliamentary organizations, and 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) as observers— is responsible for more practical 
and legally binding agreements, such as on maritime search and rescue, marine oil 
pollution preparedness and response, and scientific cooperation.179 The Barents Euro-
Arctic Cooperation and the Northern Dimension are also entities to provide more 
opportunities for coordination at the regional level.180 Finally, at the state level, the Arctic 
States themselves are the main actors governing the Arctic. 
 
Analyzing Danish and Russian Arctic policies led to the conclusion that both countries 
have similar vision of the Arctic governance. They support and promote the current 
system of the Arctic Governance. Denmark and Russia are interested in the process of 
sovereignizing the Arctic territory and enhancing cooperation through the Arctic 
Council.181 They disapprove of any attempts to internationalize the Arctic in a way as it 
was done with Antarctica.182 Particularly, they strongly oppose the idea of adopting any 
extra international convention on the Arctic - akin to the Antarctic Treaty, that in fact 
prohibits any national sovereignty in the Antarctica183.  
 
One of the proponents of such convention in the Arctic was the EU184. On October 9, 
2009, The EU Parliament adopted the Resolution on the Arctic Governance emphasizing 
the concern for the environment, security and energy in the Arctic, and calling for an 
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international treaty for the Arctic protection similar to the Antarctic Treaty.185 Following 
the words of Danish ex-minister of Foreign Affairs Lene Espersen (2010-2011), such 
convention “is proposed by some who think that the Arctic is not governed by laws and 
regulations. That is not the case.” 186 This position coincides with other Arctic States’ 
position that was firmly expressed in the Ilulissat Declaration adopted by members of the 
Arctic Council in 2008.187 In this declaration, the Arctic states proclaimed that the current 
international law “provides a solid foundation for responsible management by the five 
coastal states and other users of this Ocean through national implementation and 
application of relevant provisions.” 188 
 
Consequently, the Arctic States recognized no need for elaborating “a new 
comprehensive international legal regime to govern the Arctic Ocean.”189 In my opinion, 
to validate their stance on absence of the necessity of new international convention in the 
eyes of the international society, the Arctic States, including Denmark and Russia, are 
taking great efforts to strengthen the current system of the Arctic governance. This vision 
is particularly carried out through the enhancement of the position of the Arctic Council 
as the main international platform for cooperation in the Arctic and strengthening the role 
of existing international conventions concerning the Arctic.  
 
For instance, it was Denmark that organized Ilulissat meeting of the Arctic Council where 
the Ilulissat Declaration was signed. The Ilulissat Declaration confirms the UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea as the main legal framework for resolving territorial 
disputes in the Arctic.190 However, the Declaration did not only manifest the way of 
dealing with territorial disputes in the Arctic through the existing international convention 
in a cooperation mood, it also demonstrated the world that the Arctic belongs to the Arctic 
states only.191 The idea of the Declaration was wholly heart welcomed by Russia.192 The 
following development of the Arctic Council such as adoption of legal binding 
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agreements between the Arctic states again proved the commitment of the Arctic States, 
particularly Denmark and Russia, to their common vision of supporting existing model 
of the Arctic governance.193  
 
Alluding the adoption of treaty similar to the Antarctic treaty in the Arctic case is 
explained by the rational choice of the Arctic states, that was determined by their national 
interests. Particularly, Denmark and Russia share common desire not to miss an 
opportunity to sovereignize vast natural resources preserved in the Arctic, in the region 
that is expected to be “the main energy territory on the planet in the 21st century”.194 In 
other words, Denmark and Russia wish to exclude other non-Arctic states from the direct 
participation in the Arctic governance.195 
 
The aim to sovereignize the Arctic is explicitly presented in Danish and Russian claims 
on the continental shelf in the Arctic Ocean outside their Exclusive Economic Zones. 
Some clarifications of this claim process is called for. Denmark and Russia ratified the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) adopted and signed in 1982, 
according to which the state has the right to claim the territory beyond its exclusive zone 
if it is able to prove that this territory is the continuation of its continental shelf.196  
 
In 2001, Russia was the 1st country that applied for this procedure in the Arctic.197 
Nevertheless, due to the lack of scientific data, most importantly the reliable theoretical 
model of geodynamic evolution process of the Arctic, proving the continental nature of 
claimed territories, the claim was disapproved of the UN Commission on the Limits of 
the Continental Shelf (CLCS) and sent back for further elaboration.198 During more than 
10 years Russia had been collecting new data to present it CLCS in august 2015.199 The 
decision on this claim is expected to be announced in summer 2019.200 In case of the 
positive decision, Russia is going to get an opportunity to expand its territory by 1.2 
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million square kilometers (over 463,000 sq. miles) of sea shelf extending more than 350 
nautical miles (about 650 km) from the shore, including the Lomonosov Ridge, 
Mendeleev-Alpha Rise and the Chukchi Plateu Ridges with estimated reservoirs of about 
5 billion tons of standard fuel.201 
 
In December 2014, Denmark also presented its claim on approximately 895,541 square 
kilometers of the Arctic seabed to the north of Greenland, where part of this territory, to 
be specific, areas of Amundsen Basin, the Lomonosov Ridge, Makarov-Podvodnikov 
Basins and Mendeleev Rise, area under the North Pole overcross the Russian’s claimed 
territory. Overall, overcrossing territories comprise 550000 square kilometers.202 
 
It is worth stating that the mentioned above disputable territories triggered a big turmoil 
in mass media and scientific research. Many journalists and researchers described it as 
the beginning of the struggle for the Arctic by Denmark and Russia.203 Michael Byers, 
Professor at the University of British Columbia, named Danish claim not required 
provocation at a critical time. He warned Denmark of possible unwanted reaction from 
Russia.204 Several researchers predict more intrusive Russian naval exercises or aircraft 
operations near the Denmark’s border within the Baltic Sea.205 
  
Nowadays, this controversial overcrossing issue is still presented as the biggest challenge 
in the development of peaceful Danish-Russian relations in the Arctic. However, I do not 
agree with this vision. In opposite, I think this claim is not a sigh of tension in their 
relations rather it is a sigh of cooperation. To get this idea, we have to look carefully 
trough the claim procedure.  
 
First and foremost, it is worth mentioning that decisions produced by the UN commission 
themselves are not documents supposed to determine the delimitation of borders between 
Denmark and Russia in the Arctic. The UN Commission has authority to give scientific 
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approval if the claimed territories are expanding of the continental shelf or not. 
Afterwards, on the base of this approval the state can claim the area.206  
 
In case of disapproval, neither Denmark nor Russia can have an opportunity to expand 
their territories.  Claimed areas will keep their international status, particularly, they will 
be recognized as the Arctic seabed, i.e. international waters.207  
 
In other words, the main concern of Denmark and Russia is not the problem of 
delimitation but endeavor to prove that claimed areas can become the subject of this 
delimitation. This endeavor determined Danish-Russian cooperation in the scientific data 
collection driven by the grand scope of the scientific task to prove the continental nature 
of the claimed areas during the process of preparing the claims. 208 
 
Following the words of Coordinator of scientific work on the preparation of the Russian 
application Leopol’d Lobkovskij, “We (Russia) do not have conflicts with Denmark and 
Canada (Canada is also planning to claim the same territory) as all three countries are 
interested in the expanding of the continental shelf to the North Pole”.209 He also 
continued that disputable ridges in the Arctic run from Russian Eurasian suburbs to 
Greenland and Canadian North American suburbs. Consequently, Denmark, Russia and 
Canada have common basis for extending the shelf. 210 
 
 
Figure 10. Lomonosov Ridge (Source: Winz 2013) 
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Figure 11. Main Ridges in the Arctic (Source: Quinn 2019)   
 
The claim process as well as the problem of scientific back up of territories were not a 
secret to both sides that encouraged Denmark and Russia to cooperate on this issue.211 
Moreover, there was even an idea from the Russian side to have a joint application to the 
UN CLCS.212 In many interviews, Russian scientists and authorities express the idea that 
both claims are not controversial to each other but, in contrast, they are supportive to each 
other and make the adoption of the positive decision on them more likely.213 Statements 
delivered by high Danish and Russian authorities on legitimacy of the applications and 
their consonance with the Ilulissat declaration provisions underline the peaceful nature of 
the presented claims.  
 
The representatives of both countries constantly emphasize their commitment to resolve 
future possible territorial disputes in case of the UN CLCS acknowledging the claims 
through the process of negotiations and bilateral agreements.214 Taking into account the 
precedents of peaceful resolution of territorial disputes in the Arctic, such as division of 
the territory between Norway and Russia in the Barents Sea, and common endeavor of 
                                                          
211 The Information and Press Department of the Russian Foreign Ministry 2014; 
Markusen  2010   
212 Lobkovskij 2015 
213 Ibid.; Vasil’ev 2013 
214 Putin 2017 (b)  
51 
 
Denmark and Russia to elude conflict situations in the Arctic, there is a great possibility 
that the question of overall claims will be resolved in the cooperative mode.215 More than 
that, the US and other Arctic States approve of the claim process.216 
 
It is worth mentioning that there was an attempt taken by the Russian side to resolve the 
delimitation of the disputed areas between Denmark and Russia by the preliminary 
bilateral agreements prior to the decision of the UN CLCS. The idea was announced by 
the head of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment of the Russian Federation, 
Sergej Donskoj (2012-2018) in 2016.217 
 
However, the Danish side did not approve of this action. Danish Foreign Minister Kristian 
Jensen proclaimed Denmark’s wish not to settle down this question before the UN 
assessment and, more than that, not to complicate its relationship with its NATO ally, 
Canada that was preparing its own claim for the same disputed areas.218  
 
Afterwards, in terms of the Arctic governance, there is a great cooperation in Danish- 
Russian relations. Both countries want to exclude “other” non-Arctic states from direct 
participation in the Arctic governance. They actively promote existing multi-layer 
governance model and see the Arctic as an object of fulfillment of their sovereign rights. 
A strong desire to give the Arctic areas the status of national territories of the Arctic states 
is the main driver for Danish-Russian cooperation in terms of governance. It is the exact 
field of overlapping interests of both states.  
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IV. DANISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS IN THE ARCTIC IN TERMS OF ECONOMY 
 
 
4.1. General trends 
 
To understand the main drivers of economic relations between two states in the Arctic 
region, a brief review of both economies is required. It seems to be impossible to analyze 
economic Danish-Russian relations in the Arctic without general acquaintance with 
Danish and Russian economies, their trends and goals. This paragraph is supposed to 
handle this task.  
 
Denmark is considered one of the most prosperous countries in the world. 219According 
to World Competitors Yearbook, it occupies the 6th position in terms of competitive 
capabilities of its economy.220 The Kingdom is recognized as one of the best countries for 
business running and implementing innovations.221 Its economy is export-oriented. Such 
products as agricultural goods, pharmaceuticals and technical equipment, technologies 
and innovations are main export items.222 In addition, Denmark is one of the leading 
maritime countries. 223 
 
Nowadays, the main market for Denmark is the EU.224 However, China is gaining its 
economic weight in the eyes of Danish business elites due to the scope and size of China’s 
market and what is more important due to significant investments China can provide 
Denmark for economic development.225 
 
Moreover, Denmark holds the 1st position in the world ranking in terms of energy 
efficiency.226 Denmark possesses oil and gas resources. However, Denmark’s oil 
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production has decreased since 2004 and in 2015 its oil consumption surplus its 
production.227 It is estimated that the following 25 years Denmark’s oil production will 
totally stop.228 Being a producer of natural gas, Denmark is a net exporter of the natural 
gas.229  
 
The Arctic melting has opened new opportunities for Danish economy. First, opening of 
the Arctic sea trade routes is very essential for Danish shipping industry. Secondly, 
appearing of more ice-free water space in the Arctic is another asset for Danish fishing 
companies. Thirdly, the vast oil and gas deposits that could be found in Greenland 
according to the US Geology Service can bring a great profit to the development of 
Danish economy. Finally, difficult environmental conditions in the Arctic call for 
innovations in technologies for oil and shipping industries that Denmark can export to 
other countries, such as China and Russia. In other words, the Arctic and its development 
go in line with Denmark’s national interests in terms of prosperity. 
 
In contrast, Russian economy is not as developed as Danish one. It occupies the 38th 
position in terms of competitive capabilities in the world.230 Russian economy is also 
export oriented.231 However, in comparison with Denmark, the export goods are not so 
various. Natural resources are the main export items and the solid foundation of Russian 
economy. 232 
 
These circumstances make the Arctic and its expected great oil and gas volumes are 
crucially important for Russia. Russian authorities directly point out “the strategic 
significance” of the development of Arctic continental shelf oil and gas deposits and, 
following it, the promotion of Russian shipbuilding to transport these resources through 
the NSR.233 Especially, this issue is of great concern of Russia as existing oil and gas 
deposits exploited in other parts of Russia are estimated to be dwelled in 30-50 years.234  
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The availability of the NSR is also extremely important for Russia, because the NSR 
mostly lies in Russian territorial waters so that Russia can fully enjoy its location as the 
transit area.235 Ice melting gives another edge to Russian fishery industry. Like in case of 
Denmark, the Arctic is viewed in Russia as a profitable region for future business 
operations.   
 
In terms of trade, Denmark and Russia are not significant partners to each other.236 As a 
rule, Denmark’s exports to Russia industrial equipment, pharmaceuticals and scientific 
equipment.237 In turn, Russia exports natural resources such as oil, coal and iron.238 In 
2015, Russia accounted for 46% of Denmark’s oil products imports.239 In 2016, Russia 
accounted for 64.1% of Danish solid fuel imports.240 However, in total, as for 2016, 
Russia represented 0.8% of Denmark’s export and 1.7% of its import. 241 
 
There is no great investment activity between countries either. By the end of 2016, Russia 
was responsible for minial 0.1% of Denmark’s foreign direct investment.242 Most Danish 
investments are directed into the real sector of Russian economy: Carlsberg, Novo-
Nordisk, Danfoss, Rockwood and some others243. The small amount of investments is 
registered from the Russian side, too.244 The major companies in Denmark with Russian 
capital “NLMK DanSteel”, “Silvatec Skovmaskiner A/S” и “Affitech A/S”.245  
 
Meanwhile, there is evidence of states’ endeavors to promote economic relations. In 
accordance with these endeavors the Intergovernmental Russian-Danish Economic 
Cooperation Council, a special platform for business meetings was created in 2004.246 
The forum was established in accordance with the Agreement on the development of 
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economic, industrial, scientific and technical cooperation between the Russian Federation 
and the Kingdom of Denmark of 27 October 1992. 247 There is also a special body for 
fostering economic cooperation in the Arctic, the Arctic Economic Council, an 
independent organization, created by the Arctic Council during 2013-2015.248 Being 
members of the Arctic Council Denmark and Russia have an opportunity to elaborate 
their economic relations in the region with the help of this body. 
 
This analysis leads us to the conclusion that Denmark and Russia do not perceive each 
other as the indispensable partners in terms of general economic context. However, 
common economic interests that both states share in the Arctic can generate cooperation 
in the fields of mutual concern. In general, economic Danish-Russian relations in the 
Arctic can be analyzed in the following sectors: oil and gas exploitation, shipping, 
shipbuilding, fishery, energy and tourism.  
 
 
4.2. Oil and gas exploitation 
 
Oil and gas exploitation of the Arctic is on the top of the Russian Arctic agenda. The 
share of the Arctic shelf in the overall Russian resources is overwhelming. The Arctic 
counts for 90% of overall Russian shelf hydrocarbons and 70% of total oil deposits.249 
Following the predictions of the US Geology Service, Russia possesses 41% of total 
Arctic oil resources and 70% of total gas Arctic resources. 250 These potential resources 
are very crucial for Russian future development. The Arctic is considered to be as the 
solution of dwelling oil and gas resources that Russia is going to face in future. 251 
 
Moreover, Russia has always been regarding dependence of other states on its natural 
resources as a lever to defend its political interests. In this light, the Arctic can be 
considered significant not only in terms of economy, but also in terms of geopolitical 
capacity that Russia is willing to gain.   
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Russian endeavor to exploit natural resources in the Arctic is enshrined in its Arctic 
Strategy documents such as ‘The Foundations of the State Policy of the Russian 
Federation in the Arctic up to 2020 and Beyond’ and “The Strategy for the Development 
of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation up to 2020.”252 Russian state own 
companies: Rosneft and Gazprom, the only companies authorized by the Russian 
government to develop Arctic oil and gas off-shore products, invested a great sum of 
money into their Arctic projects and called the Arctic exploitation a priority area for the 
development.253 Particularly, Rosneft is going to invest about 500 billion dollars into the 
Arctic development. 254 
However, Russian companies encounter the problems of insufficiency of Russian 
technologies in development and exploitation of Arctic resources.255 Besides, severe 
weather conditions raise the issue of high cost of Arctic oil exploitation so that the 
financial ground of the Russian companies cannot allow them to develop these projects 
only by their own efforts.256  
 
The Russian government realizes the need for great investments and international 
cooperation in the Arctic oil exploitation. Following this inspirit, Gazprom and Rosneft 
made several agreements with foreign oil and gas companies such as Statoil, Eni, EXON-
MOBIL, BP, Total to develop its Arctic continental shelf projects.257 The most explicit 
example of such cooperation is collaboration between EXON-MOBIL and Rosneft on 
exploration of oil resources in the Kara Sea that was successfully finished in 2014. 258 
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Figure 12. Arctic Off-Shore Projects (Source: Kaznacheev 2015 ) 
 
Among other successful Russian projects in Russian Arctic, one should mention another 
project. Obviously, I mean the 1st and still the only project in Russian history on extracting 
off-shore oil deposits in the Arctic which resulted in the 1st stationary platform for 
extracting from the Arctic shelf in the world in 2014.259 The platform named 
Prirazlomnaya is situated in the Pechora Sea. The project was fulfilled by Gazprom.260 
The investments of foreign companies led Russia to designing optimistic scenarios of 
further development of Russian Arctic off-shore projects.261 
 
However, everything changed in 2014 when the sanctions of the EU and the US were 
implemented. The EU implemented sanctions on Russia in March  in 2014 to strongly 
condemn Russian actions in Ukraine, particularly “Russia’s illegal annexation of 
Crimea.”262 The imposed sanctions concern travel bans and property freezes against 
persons involved in “actions against Ukraine's territorial integrity.” 263 Later in July 2014, 
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the EU imposed economic sanctions and reinforced them in September 2014.264  The 
economic sanctions include sanctions on the Russian public banks, embargo on military 
goods and restriction on the export of technologies, services and equipment, concerning 
oil industry.265 In particular, companies of the EU states are not allowed to sell and 
provide services to the Russian projects on oil exploration and production in deep waters, 
in the offshore areas in the Arctic and shale formations.266 The EU declared sanctions to 
be in force until the full implementation of the Minsk Agreements by the Russian side.267 
Moreover, the US supported this by implementing their own package of sanctions on 
Russia.268  
 
According to the American and Russian authorities, the main aim of sanctions was to curl 
Russian activities in oil and gas sectors in the Arctic.269 Due to the sanctions, a lot of 
international joint projects were delayed or closed despite the ensurance granted by the 
Russian authorities that sanctions would cause no suspension in the realization of joint 
Arctic projects. 270 
 
Although foreign companies were reluctant to get out of the projects, the political 
situation forced them to do it.271 It was a huge blow to Russian Arctic ambitions. Russia 
did not have substitution to western technologies and enough investments.272 This state 
of affairs pushed Russia to look in another way. It has been doing all its best to attract 
investments from Asian countries like China, Japan, India and Vietnam. There were 
signed agreements.273  
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Also, Russia has proclaimed the course of import substitution and allocated a lot of money 
in technology development.274 It is worth mentioning that technology development 
consumes a lot of time, more than 5-10 years. Asian countries do not have sufficient 
experience and innovative technologies for off-shore oil extractions which make further 
Russian off-shore oil development still unlikely.275  
 
There are much more possibilities in the development of on-shore oil and gas deposits in 
the Arctic where there is a room for public-private cooperation. Novatek is one of such 
private companies. Particularly, this company is responsible for opening Yamal 1 and is 
working on the project LNG Project Arctic 2 on Yamal Penninsula. China and France are 
also engaged into this project.276  
 
Denmark is a country with its own oil and gas companies like Dong and Moller expected 
to have great chances to participate in the exploitation of oil and gas resources in the 
Russian Arctic.277 However, these expectations were not justified.  
 
In 2010, there were real attempts to create joint Moller Maersk-Gazprom projects. The 
Russian Prime-Minister (2008-2012) Vladimir Putin visited the Maersk headquarter 
during its visit to Copenhagen.278 There was also a meeting between Moller Maersk 
Group Vice-President Klaus Rud Sejling and Gazprom Deputy Chairman of the 
company’s management Committee Aleksandr Ananenkov, on discussing future 
cooperation in the development of the Artic off-shore oil and gas deposits in 2011.279  
 
The same year, Rosneft’s chief-executive Eduard Khudanaitov mentioned Maersk oil 
alongside Norway’s Statoil as possible partners in the Arctic.280 These statements echoed 
the endeavor of Maersk’s chief executive who undoubtedly demonstrated his interest in 
this cooperation: ‘We would be interested in entering oil sector in Russia’.281 Meanwhile, 
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there was a precedent of cooperation between Danish oil company Dong Energy and 
Gazprom. In 2011, the companies signed the Memorandum about intentions to cooperate 
in the energy sector.282  
 
Nevertheless, all these endeavors were not fulfilled. Possibly, due to some economic 
interests, Rosneft and Gazprom preferred Norwegian, British, American, French and 
Italian companies as their chief partners. After the implementation of the sanctions in 
2014, the opportunities for this cooperation were squandered. Still, to my mind, even if 
the sanctions are lifted there will no big chance for Danish-Russian cooperation in the 
field of oil and gas exploitation in the Arctic as big Danish oil and gas companies like 
Moller Maersk and Dong are restructuring their businesses and selling their oil and gas 
branches. For instance, Maersk sold its oil exploration and production business to French 
oil company Total in 2017 and declared shipping the major direction of business strategy. 
283 Dong Energy agreed to sell its oil and gas business to Petrochemicals firm INIOS and 
focus on developing on-shore wind energy.  
 
These decisions can be explained by several reasons. The first reason is announced by the 
company owners: the low price of oil since 2013/4 makes running oil business 
unprofitable. 284In my opinion, the second reason is estimated cease of oil production in 
Denmark in 25 years due to exhausting existing deposits285. In brief, there is a little 
possibility for Danish companies involvement into oil and gas exploitation in the Russian 
Arctic even in the case of global political tension relief.  
 
However, joint oil and gas projects in the Arctic are not the only spheres where Danish 
and Russian relations can be analyzed through the oil and gas exploitation lenses. 
Denmark and Russia have at great point similar situation in oil and gas exploitation in the 
Arctic. Both countries possess a high volume of resources in the Arctic with most of them 
not well explored by now.286 From this perspective, the Russian case is more favorable 
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as some deposits have already been successfully explored, whereas in Greenland no 
deposits despite several expensive English and Australian projects have been spotted.287  
 
There is also a great necessity for both states to bring investors to the Arctic projects. 
Taking into account Greenland’s modest economy and high dependence on Danish 
government subsidies, Greenland does not have substantial financial fund to exploit its 
natural resources. 
 
More than that, both countries see China as the most likely option to get investments for 
their natural resources development. Nowadays, Denmark pays primary attention to 
development of economic relations with China.288 Denmark was one of the countries that 
strongly advocated granting China the status of an observer in the Arctic Council.289 
China has invested a lot of money to Greenland.290 Some Danish politicians believe that 
these investments can provoke negative reactions of the US and promote China’s political 
interest in the Arctic.291  
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Figure 13. Chinese Involvement in Greenland. Five Projects (Source: Jiang 2018)   
 
Russia is also in efforts to attract China’s investments due to the fact that China is highly 
interested in the development of the NSR as the way to get necessary natural resources 
from Russia to develop its economy.292 For instance, China is one of the partners of the 
project Arctic LNG 2.293 China Silk Road Fund invested a lot into Russia’s LNG Gas 
Project in Yamal.294 
 
In my opinion, this makes Denmark and Russia competitive to each other in terms of 
attracting foreign investments including Chinese ones. At the same time, both states have 
their pros and cons for investors.  
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Denmark has no bureaucratic obstacles and corruption, which make it one of the best for 
investments.295 Moreover, in contrast to Russia, there are no sanctions imposed on 
Greenland’s oil and gas exploration. In this light, Denmark is perceived as a good place 
for investments. However, there are some disadvantages. There are great expenses on 
salaries.296 In comparison to Denmark, Russia does not have so high taxes burden and the 
labor cost is not so high. Meanwhile, the existence of bureaucratic obstacles and 
corruption alongside with sanctions make Russia less attractive for investments.297  
 
Afterwards, there is no witness of the development of Danish-Russian relations in oil and 
gas exploitation. Danish companies were not and are not partners in joint international 
projects on exploiting oil and gas of the Russian Arctic. Likewise, Russia was not a 
counterpart of any projects carried out on Greenland ground. This phenomenon can be 
justified by the fact that both countries have similar challenges in the Arctic oil and gas 
development and are in extreme need for investments. At present, cooperation is not 
possible due to sanctions and withdrawal of Danish oil and gas companies from the 
market.  
 
 
4.3. Shipping 
 
Danish-Russian relations in shipping within the Arctic is determined by the development 
of the NSR. Here are the possibilities of cooperation. Meanwhile, there are some 
obstacles. Denmark as one of the 10 leading shipping states in the world has its interest 
in the development of the NSR.298 This interest is reflected in the Danish Arctic Strategy 
where the preposition of Danish endeavor to explore the need for the creation of new 
transport route can be found.299  
 
This endeavor can be explained by several reasons. Firstly, Danish companies are 
interested in the diversification of transport routes to carry goods to Asia. This interest is 
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natural. Nobody wants to have all eggs in one basket. Nowadays, the main route employed 
for transportation cargos from Europe to China is Suez Canal. Secondly, the increasing 
trade turnover between the EU and the Asian market makes shipping companies search 
for new ways where the traffic is not as heavy as in the Suez Route.300 As it is known, in 
the NSR there are no great long ship queues that gives another advantage to this route.301 
Thirdly, this route is free from pirates in contrast to Suez Canal.302 Finally, the utilizing 
of this route produces less carbon dioxide that consonants with preventing climate change 
policy.303  
 
Figure 14. (Source: The Economist 2014) 
 
All these reasons stimulate Danish shipping companies will to develop the NSR as the 
transit route. 
  
This Danish approach corresponds to the Russian approach. From Russian perspective, 
the evolution of this route is vital for the following reasons: the Arctic oil and gas deposits 
development; promoting Russian shipbuilding and NSR as international transit area and, 
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as a consequence, gaining economic profits since the most part of the NSR lies in the 
territorial waters of Russia.304  
 
However, Russia needs to settle a status question of the route. At present, Russian 
sovereignty over the routes is threatened by the US position that the NSR should be 
considered as international waters.305 This statement is in total contradiction with Russian 
point of view that regards the route as an internal transport corridor. To strengthen this 
position, Russia has produced legislation concerning the NSR. In 2012, the law on the 
NSR was adopted in Russia.306 It defines the NSR as ‘a historic national transportation 
line of the Russian Federation’ and clarifies the borders of the NSR as an internal trade 
corridor.307 In the same year, the special government Agency for organizing navigation 
in the NSR – the Administration of the NSR – was set up.308 The Russian government 
also adopted the comprehensive project on the NSR development in 2015.309  The project 
includes measures for navigation, hydrographic and hydro meteorological support of 
navigation in the waters of the NSR, for emergency and rescue services for shipping, for 
the development of seaports, for defence issues in the waters of the NSR, and for the 
design and construction of marine equipment, systems and means.310 
 
To enhance its sovereignty rights on the NSR, Russia has been increasing its military 
presence in the region and invests a lot of money in its infrastructure development, 
particularly to restoring ports, cleaning activities, opening safe and rescue stations and 
most importantly expanding ice breaking fleet.311 Three new modern icebreakers are 
being produced and recently the production of 3 new icebreakers has been announced.312 
By 2035, it is expected that Russian Arctic fleet will have had 13 heavy icebreakers 
including 9 nuclear ice-breakers. 313 
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Due to the above mentioned measures, Russia controls the NSR passage. No ship can 
pass this route without Russian Agency permission. As before, no foreign vessel has 
sailed the NSR without obtaining Moscow’s permission since 1965.314 The Russian 
successful tendency in the ensuring sovereignty right of the route can also be explained 
by the US reluctance on promoting its international status at present thanks to American 
occupation with other issues of foreign policy.  
 
Some achievements were reached on the way of the NSR development. These 
achievements are reflected in the volume of cargo transportation through the NSR. The 
growing tendency of this cargo transportation proves the life capability of this route. In 
2018, the volume of goods transported via the NSR skyrocketed by 81%, announced the 
representative of the Russian Ministry for Maritime and River Transport in an interview 
with PortNews.315 By the end of 2018 about 20 million tons  were transported to and from 
ports along the NSR.316 In 2017, 5.5 million tons were transported.317 
 
Denmark and its companies are not aside from this process. There are regular meetings 
and forums between Danish and Russian authorities concerning the transport regulations 
of the NSR.318 Among such meetings Russian-Danish transport working meetings in 
Copenhagen took place in January 2018.319 Both countries are cooperating on the 
implementation Polar Code 2018 concerning navigation in the Arctic. 320 
 
Danish shipping companies are ones of the most proactive foreign shipping enterprises in 
using the NSR alongside with China. It was particular Danish carrier that was one of the 
1st non-Russian vessel sailing via the NSR. In 2010, the Nordic bulk carrier “Nordic 
Barents” travelled from Norway to China transporting iron ore.321 In 2011, the same 
company transported iron ore from the northern part of Russia to China with bulk carrier 
of ice class through the NSR.322 It is worth mentioning that the US based owner takes 
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control over entire Nordic bulk company in 2015.323 Therefore, at present, this company 
activities in the NSR more represents American involvement in the exploitation of the 
NSR than Danish one.  
 
However, in 2018, the leading Danish shipping company Maersk Moller successfully 
finished the NSR trial voyage. The company sent container ship named “Ventamaersk” 
to carry a load of frozen fish from Vladivostok to St. Petersburg. During the voyage, the 
vessel was escorted by Rosatom’s nuclear icebreaker324. This event was highly welcome 
by Russian authorities. During the negotiations on this trial Russian special representative 
of President on nature, ecology and transport, Sergej Ivanov (2016-present) called it an 
example of Danish-Russian cooperation ‘beyond the sphere of political controversies’.325 
 
Meanwhile, according to Maersk-Moller representatives, the ultimate goal of the voyage 
was to obtain operational experience in the Arctic and test its new ice class Baltic feeders, 
specifically designed to operate in cold waters.326 Palle Laursen, chief technical officer at 
Maersk, elaborated this idea stating following: ‘Currently we don’t see the NSR as the 
viable commercial alternative to existing East-West routes.’327 Among the reasons for 
this approach he pointed out a short period of the availability of the route for navigation 
(only 3 months a year) and additional investments that are required to construct ice class 
vessels. Still, he emphasizes that Maersk Moller ‘do follow the development of the 
NSR.’328 
 
In sight of estimations published by Copenhagen business school that after 2040 the NSR 
can become a real alternative to Suez Canal, it becomes clear what development is 
applied.329 Hence, Laursen’s statement shows both incentives and obstacles for further 
involvement of Danish shipping companies into the NSR development.  
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Still, there are more obstacles in this light. These obstacles can be characterized by 
general lack of the necessary capacity of both states as well as specific problems existing 
in each state. 
 
Firstly, administrative and beurocratic barriers are presented by the Russian 
government.330 This consideration proved its validity by recent events when Russia 
adopted new amendments to trade sailing code in 2017, according to which oil and LNG 
transit via the NSR must be fulfilled only by means of Russian flag vessels. The adoption 
of these amendments was justified by the necessity of protection of the Russian 
shipbuilding producers. Russian authorities also referred to existing similar legislation in 
other countries.331 This decision provoked negative reaction of Danish shipping 
companies.332  
 
To put it simply, there is an inherent contradiction in the Russian policy towards the 
development of the NSR. On the one hand, Russia wants to make the NSR the 
international route. On the other hand, it wants to restore its shipbuilding. Meanwhile, 
since passing these amendments Russian authorities had to mitigate them due to the 
incapability to provide sufficient amount of Russian flag vessels to cope with the transit 
demand.333 In my opinion, the delay of construction of the ship yard ‘Zvezda’, which is 
supposed to be the center of shipbuilding for Arctic transit demands, as well as sanctions 
that were imposed by the EU and the US on several Russian ship yards and ship building 
plants including ‘Zvezda’ on the 16th March, 2019, played its role in this incapability.  
 
Afterwards, on the 20th of March, 2019, Prime-Minister Medvedev signed Order 435-р 
that allowed 26 foreign flag vessels to transit LNG till 2043. Still, the destiny of oil 
transition is not settled yet. 334 
 
Secondly, the lack of specially trained staff to work in the Arctic conditions is one more 
problem that has to be regulated.335 Thirdly, the lack of knowledge about operating in the 
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Arctic waters.336 Fourthly, severe costs of not only ice class vessel construction, but also 
of communication and emergency management in the Arctic.337 Following the Russian 
regulations, all vessels passing via the NSR should have insurance.338 They also have to 
pay for weather and ice reports as well as for icebreakers escorting.339 Finally, still not 
sufficiently developed infrastructure of the NSR is an obstacle of promoting Danish 
shipping companies involvement to transport goods via the NSR.340 The shallow waters 
of the Arctic Ocean are suitable only for small vessels which makes goods transportation 
via the NSR more expensive, in comparison to Suez canal.341 
 
As a result, Danish-Russian relations in the Arctic shipping have pros and cons. Danish 
companies have explicit interests in the promoting the NSR. However, these interests 
have a long-term prospect. At present, Danish companies do not see immediate profit 
from exploiting the NSR due to environmental and socio-economic challenges that 
explains their gradual involvement in the development of the NSR. What can be really 
expected is increase in Danish commitment to the NSR employing step-by-step along 
with further expanding of ice-free waters in the Arctic. The ambiguous position of the 
Russian government on attracting foreign partners will also be one of the main factors 
defining the result of this process. Nowadays, the task of clarification of Russian policy 
towards the NSR by the Russian government is called for.    
 
 
4.4. Shipbuilding 
 
To understand Danish-Russian relations in shipbuilding sector, explanation of Russian 
and Danish positions in the world of shipbuilding is required.  
 
At the beginning of the 1990s, Denmark was a leading European country in terms of 
tonnage launched. Later, Danish shipbuilding was surpassed by such developed 
shipbuilding countries as Japan, South Korea and China. In 2012, Denmark closed the 
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last big shipyard.342 However, Danish companies working on the development of the ship 
equipment survived and are still playing role in the global shipbuilding.343 Some Danish 
companies relocated their production capacities to Asia, the leading region in the world 
shipbuilding.344 It is in this way that Danish companies have preserved their, maybe 
indirect, place in shipbuilding industry. 
 
Russia’s shipbuilding witnesses ups and downs. Being highly developed during the Soviet 
Era, Russian shipbuilding experienced its deterioration after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union.345 However, since the end of 2000s the Russian government has adopted several 
strategies and laws to restore Russian shipbuilding.346 Nowadays, Russia’s share in the 
world military shipbuilding is 12%. Russia has the second position in the world in terms 
of producing military vessels.347 Despite that fact, Russia is not so successful in civilian 
and cargo production. The Russian civil shipbuilding comprises only about 0.5% of the 
total volume of the world civil transport shipbuilding in terms of the compensated gross 
tonnage or 1.3% - in terms the number of vessels.348 Instead, China, Japan and South 
Korea are responsible for 90% of the world cargo ship production349.  
 
Russian authorities view Arctic and its development as a way to promote Russian non-
military shipbuilding in the global market. The construction of sea platforms and 
icebreakers for exploitation and transporting the Artic oil and gas is considered to become 
one of the main “niches” of Russian shipbuilding in the world.350  
 
Inspired by this aim, the decision of building a grand shipyard “Zvezda” in the Primorskii 
krai was taken. The building of the shipyard with the participation of Asian partners 
started in 2009 and was planning to be finished in 2018. Recently, it was declared that the 
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deadline was postponed until 2020.351 After its launching, the shipyard is supposed to be 
able to satisfy demand for ice class vessels and platforms, employed in the Arctic.352 
Particularly, this shipyard was chosen as a site for the construction of the icebreaker 
"Leader" with a capacity of 140 MW, the technical project of which has already been 
developed. The construction of the vessel will begin in the Far East in 2020. It has also 
been announced that the shipyard will be responsible for the construction of a pilot gas 
carrier vessel for the Arctic LNG-2 project.353  
 
To sum up, Danish-Russian relations in shipbuilding evolve in the context of Russian 
ambitions to increase its role in the world shipbuilding and endeavors of Danish 
companies, producing ship equipment, to find sales market. Here, there is an obvious 
coincidence of interests that both sides are aware of. There are some evidence to this 
statement. In 2010-2011, several meetings between high authorities devoted to Danish-
Russian cooperation in shipbuilding took place. The emphasis on possible cooperation 
was made by Putin in 2010. 354 
 
There is a long tradition of Danish-Russian relations in shipbuilding. Danish companies 
producing necessary equipment for ship construction have always been welcome on the 
Russian market.355 Such Danish companies, as SELCO, Furino Eurus LLC, Teledure 
Resson A/S at different times have been partners of Russian companies in implementing 
various shipbuilding projects.356 The most explicit case of employing Danish equipment 
and innovations in the Russian Arctic shipbuilding occurred when the world's leading 
manufacturer of energy-saving equipment and drive technology Danish Company 
Danfoss provided the necessary technologies and equipment for the construction of two 
ice-class vessels “Aleksandr Seninkov” and “Andrei Vilnickii”.357 These two vessels 
were ordered by state-owned company Gazprom within Gazprom’s program “Time of 
Arctic” for providing all-year transportation of oil from “Novoportovoe” deposit via the 
NSR. The order was fulfilled by “Viborgskii shipbuilding plant” that ensured its plan to 
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further attract Danfoss technical system in ice-class vessel building.358 One should admit 
that Danfoss is successfully engaged into other Russian projects, not connected with 
shipbuilding, such as providing energy efficiency technologies for buildings and Arctic 
plants.359 
 
However, sanctions imposed by the US, Canada and the EU on Russian shipyards and 
shipbuilding plants in response to Russia’s policy in Ukraine make Russia be primarily 
focused on cooperation with Asian partners in the development of the Russian shipyards 
in general, and the shipyard “Zvezda” in particular.360 
 
Another important implication of this sanction process is Russia’s orientation on import 
substitution. In March 31st, 2015, Order 661 on approval of sectoral action plans for 
import substitution in shipbuilding industry of the Russian Federation was adopted by the 
Ministry of Industry and Trade. This document is a plan of activities with the 
implementation period of projects up to 2022. According to the programme, at the time 
of its approval, the share of imports, for example, turbochargers for hybrid main diesel-
gear units, in the helical columns in large-capacity transport vessels, is 100 %. By 2020, 
the planned maximum share of import of the above-mentioned categories is to be reduced 
up to 20-60 %.361 Recent amendments to Order 719, adopted in March 28th, 2019 state 
new requirements for the localization of Russian shipbuilding and ship equipment 
production in Russia. These requirements are quite flexible for sea class vessels, so they 
are not going to complicate the work of the shipyard “Zvezda”. However, they are quite 
strict for river class vessels. According to Russian authorities, the aim of the amendments 
is to support Russian local companies.362 The topic of import-substitution was also echoed 
in International Marine Forum of Russia in 2015 and International Forum Marine Industry 
of Russia in 2017.363 
 
In brief, Danish companies realize their interests in the Russian shipbuilding sector. This 
trend is mutually beneficial in terms of the Arctic development. However, at present, there 
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are some obstacles. As it was mentioned before, Russia is more interested now in Asian 
partners due to the sanctions and high professionalism of the Asian companies. Besides, 
Asian companies are better option for future shipyard “Zvezda” due to their geographic 
proximity to the shipyard364. Therefore, shipping equipment from Asian partners is more 
cost-efficient. Meanwhile, there is still a possibility for Danish companies to take it 
through its companies functioning in Asia.  
 
Another obstacle on further Danish-Russian cooperation is Russian proclaimed course on 
import substitution. Anyway, this course mainly refers to river class vessels. In other 
words, there is still a room for employment foreign equipment in the sea class vessels.  
Afterwards, Denmark and Russia have mutual interests in the shipbuilding cooperation 
in the Arctic. The investigation of this interest is generally determined by international 
political situation. To be more specific, the sanctions have direct influence on Danish 
companies’ involvement into Russian shipbuilding projects, including the Arctic vessels 
and sea platforms construction projects.  
 
 
4.5. NSR infrastructure development 
 
Danish shipping companies can participate in restoring and development of Russian 
Arctic ports. Nowadays, the Russian government invests a lot of resources in their 
restoration. At the latest International Arctic Forum held in St. Petersburg the Russian 
President Vladimir Putin urged other countries to take part in Russian Arctic ports 
development.365 The Danish shipping company Maersk-Moller has the necessary 
experience in port management, particularly in Russia. Maersk terminal operator APM 
Terminals partly owns Russian port terminal company Global ports.366 Global ports is the 
operator of 5 container terminals in Russia with 2 of them located in Finland and 1 oil 
terminal.367 Though Denmark does not keep any companies on the Arctic ground, it 
definitely has a potential to accept Vladimir Putin's offer due to the sufficient experience 
of Denmark’s business entities with Russian counterparts in ports management. However, 
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the final decision will be determined primary by revenues of the particular companies. 
More traffic in the Arctic will produce more income. As a result, the correlation between 
the growing open-waters in the Arctic and Danish companies’ involvement into ports 
development can be identified. 
 
 
4.6. Fishery 
 
Fishery is a strategic branch of the Russian economy. Russia is one of the top 10 World 
Fishing Nations. 368 
 
The Arctic plays a significant role in the Russia fishing industry. The Arctic waters are 
accounted for about 20% of the total country’s annual fish catch in 2017.369 The Russian 
government considers melting of the Arctic Ocean to promote the Russian fishing 
industry, as it will increase the accessibility of the waters.370 In accordance with this idea, 
Russia has adopted “Strategy for Fishery Development until 2030” in which the great 
financial allocations for the scientific research on the Arctic fishery have been allotted.371 
At present, the western part of the Russian Arctic waters is a well explored and fishery 
developed area, while the eastern part is called for exploration.372 
 
Fishery is also an essential branch of the Danish economy, particularly of Greenland and 
the Faroe Islands’ economies. In terms of annual fish catch, the Kingdom of Denmark is 
one of the leading countries in the EU and one of the ten largest fish processing countries 
in the world. 373 
 
                                                          
368 Federal Agency for Fisheries and Ministry of Agriculture of the Russian Federation 
2017, 8 
369 Stupachenko 2018 
370 Ibid  
371 Korabel.Ru. 2019 
372 Stupachenko 2018 
373 The Trade Representation of the Russian Federation in the Kingdom of Denmark 
2018, 18 
75 
 
Greenland and the Faroe Islands economies are highly dependent on exports of shrimp 
and fish. Fish accounts for 90% of Greenland’s export.374 In case of the Faroe Islands, the 
fishing industry accounts for 97% of exports and half of GDP.375 
 
Greenland, the Faroe Islands and Russia have a long tradition of cooperation in fishery 
through bilateral agreements on the fishery quota allocations. 
 
Russian-Greenland cooperation in the fishing industry is based on the intergovernmental 
agreement on mutual relations in the field of fishery signed in 1992.376 Since then, there 
have been regular annual consultations on adopting bilateral agreements on quotas 
allocation. 
 
The latest agreement was achieved at the end of 2018. According to this agreement, 
Greenland fishery companies have been granted quotas for fishing in the Barents Sea, 
while Russian fishery companies have been granted quotas for fishing in the waters next 
to Greenland.377 During the latest consultation, taking place in Moscow in December 
2018, the Greenland government asked the Russian government to consider an 
opportunity to expand the allowed area for fishing activities beyond the northern border 
of the Barents Sea with the purpose to utilize allocated shrimp quotas more effectively.378 
Russian authorities have not given any comments on this issue yet. The concerns of 
Russian business elite play a significant role in the position of the Russian government. 
There is a great opposition among Russian business elite to granting shrimp-quotas to 
Greenland. Several years ago shrimp fishing in Russia was not well developed. However, 
during the last years there have been great improvements.379 This development 
determines Russian business elite’s disapproval of ship quotas allocation to Greenland 
Government as Greenland is regarded as a competitor in shrimp industry.380 
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The quotas allocation is not the only field of Russian-Greenland relations in the fishery. 
There are strong relations in the fish trade, too. 
 
Russia is one of the top export destinations of Greenland. The principal supplies are fish 
and seafood. There was a significant increase in Greenland export to Russia in 2015 when 
the volume of the export rose by 136,2% to 58.8 million dollars compared to 2014 and 
41 times compared to 2013.381 
 
This increase and further development of Greenland fish export to Russia seemed to be 
unexpected due to the Russian embargo imposed on the food-related import from the EU 
member states and Canada. However, it was particularly this embargo, which contributed 
to promotion of Greenland export to Russia. Being non-EU member state, Greenland has 
evaded the embargo effect. At the same time, the Russian embargo put an end to fish 
export from Canada, a leading provider of cold-water shrimps to the Russian market. 
Therefore, Greenland could fill in the niche, which in turn increased Greenland's shrimp 
import to Russia from 190 tons in 2013 to 9,806 tons in 2017. The sanctions played a 
positive role in the development of Greenland's export to Russia. 
 
The Faroe Islands being a constitution part of the Kingdom of Denmark and non-EU 
member state has also improved its economy due to the development of relations with 
Russia in terms of fishing industry.382The Faroe Islands-Russian cooperation in fishing 
industry can be traced to 1977 when the agreement on mutual relations in the field of 
fishery between the USSR, the Danish Government and the Faroe Islands government 
was signed.383 Since then, there have been annual meetings of the Faroe Islands and 
Russian’s Commission on Fishery. The latest meeting of the Commission took place in 
December 2018.384 As the result of this meeting, the new agreement on quotas allocation 
was adopted.385   
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As in the case of Greenland, being non-EU member state, the Faroe Islands has well 
developed fish trade with Russia. At present, the Faroe Islands is the biggest fish supplier 
to Russia, surpassing Norway.386 Russia is one of the main markets of the Faroe Islands 
fish export. As for 2017, Russia accounted for 27% of fish export, ceding only to the EU, 
which accounted for 43%.387 Like Greenland, the Faroe Islands witnessed the significant 
increase in the export to Russia in 2014 as an effect of the introducing Russian ban on   
food-related products export from the EU and Canada. In 2015, the Faroe Islands export 
to Russia increased by 60,3% compared to 2014 and by 147, 8% compared to 2013. 388 
 
Due to this development, the Faroe Islands economy has risen by 6-8% for the last 
years.389 Inspired by this improvement, the government of the Faroe Islands constantly 
shows its endeavor to elaborate trade relations with Russia. The Faroe Islands does not 
support the EU sanctions imposed on Russia and, more than that, signed a memorandum 
of cooperation with Eurasian Economic Council including Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
Armenia and Kyrgyzstan.390 The Danish Government criticized this decision of the Faroe 
Islands government for inconsistence with the general line of the EU policy towards 
Russia.391 However, ripping benefits from fish export to Russia, the Faroe Islands 
government insists on further cooperation with the Russian Federation. Particularly, the 
Faroe Islands government offered the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council to adopt 
agreement on free-trade.392 Nowadays, this issue is on the agenda.  
 
Afterwards, Greenland and the Faroe Islands have mutual beneficial relations with the 
Russian Federation.  The economic interests and Greenland and the Faroe Islands’ 
specific status in the Kingdom of Denmark determine the development of these relations.  
Due to their autonomy, particularly in economic issues and non-EU status, Greenland and 
the Faroe Islands are able to get many benefits from the deterioration of relations between 
Russia and other countries, such as the EU states, Canada and Norway. The proclaims 
made by the Greenland and the Faroe Islands’ governments ensure the following 
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elaboration of the cooperation with Russia in the fishery. However, this development will 
definitely set the tension in relations between the Danish Government and the 
autonomous governments of Greenland and the Faroe Islands. Being non-interested in the 
complication of already not simple relations with Greenland and the Faroe Islands, 
Danish government hardly ever speaks out on the case of Greenland, the Faroe Islands 
and Russia cooperation in the fishery. 
 
Apart from fish trade and quotas allocation, another field of Danish- Russian relations in 
the fishing industry is cooperation in the sector of the fish equipment and technologies.   
The Kingdom of Denmark is one of the world leading countries in the innovation and 
equipment production. For this reason, the Russian fishery companies show their interest 
in Danish produced fish technologies. The fulfillment of this interest is explicitly reflected 
in the signing of the contract between the company Russian Fishery, one of the biggest 
fishery companies in Russia and Danish company Carsoe, specializing in  the producing 
of  fish processing equipment.393 The representatives of  Carsoe called the signing of the 
contract “a big victory” and emphasize its significance at the global level.394 Particularly, 
this case strengthens the position of the Danish companies in comparison to their 
Norwegian counterparts.395 Thus, the fish equipment trade is another facet of Danish-
Russian relations in the fish industry. 
 
Danish- Russian relations in the Arctic fishing  is also developed through multilateral 
agreements  such as Agreement between Arctic five on the Prevention of Unregulated 
High Seas Fishing in the Central Arctic signed in October, 2018.396 Following this 
agreement, the Arctic states proclaimed the ban on the fishing exploitation of the Central 
Arctic fish stock and the demand for its scientific exploration.397 Thus, there is a 
multilateral facet of the relations. 
 
To sum up, the fisheries is an economy branch that witnesses strong Danish – Russian 
cooperation in the Arctic dimension. The quotas allocation, the developed bilateral fish 
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and equipment trade, multilateral agreements are great evidence of this cooperation. 
However, this cooperation has inherent controversy since Greenland and the Faroe 
Islands, autonomous parts of the Kingdom of Denmark primarily responsible for this 
development, act not along with the general Kingdom of Denmark’s economy policy 
towards Russia, determined by the EU policy. This circumstance causes the internal 
tension between the Danish government and Greenland and the Faroe islands’ 
governments respectively. However, the Danish government do not have real legislative 
power to hinder the fostering of economic relations between Russia and these autonomous 
entities, as economy is a prerogative of Greenland and the Faroe Islands’ internal policy.    
The increasing Arctic melting and further scientific exploration of the Arctic fish stock  
can expand the existing relations. 
 
 
4.7. Energy sector 
 
There are two main ways in the energy aspect of Danish-Russian relations in the Arctic. 
They are energy efficiency and energy supply in the Arctic.  
 
Denmark is one of the world leaders in the development of energy efficiency 
technologies.398 Energy efficiency is always referred by Danish and Russian politicians 
as a priority area of Danish-Russian cooperation.399 Cooperation in the sector of energy 
efficiency is one of the main subjects of the Declaration on Partnership for Modernization 
between the Kingdom of Denmark and the Russian Federation signed in 2010.400 
 
Danish energy efficiency technologies are widely presented at the Russian market. For 
instance, the Danish company Danfoss has localized their production in Russia twenty-
six years ago, in 1993.401 It has a great experience of working on Russian energy market. 
This company completed many projects with Russian local authorities, for instance, local 
administration of Republic Yakutia and the city of St. Petersburg.402 Danfoss energy-
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efficiency technologies are used for numerous purposes such as the heating of houses, 
building ships, mining and processing plants.403 
 
The conditions of cold in the Arctic, where providing energy and warmth is crucial for 
sustaining living conditions, make these technologies significant in the eyes of the 
Russian authorities striving to develop infrastructure in the Arctic by building new ports, 
plants and houses. Following the words of the Russian Head of the Ministry of 
Construction, the houses situated in the Arctic must be constructed with the employment 
of energy-efficiency technologies.404Danfoss has already had an experience of providing 
energy-efficiency solution for Olenogorskij mining and processing plant situated in 
Murmansk.405 
 
Afterwards, there is a great expectation in Danish-Russian cooperation in this field of 
energy efficiency. Denmark has technologies to offer and Russia has a demand for them 
to develop its Arctic zone.406 The Danish decision to set up its own scientific center in 
Skolkovo in 2013 and comments of Russian authorities on importance of enhancing 
cooperation are great prove of this expectation.407 
 
As for energy supply, Denmark is prominent for its anti-nuclear position.408 Denmark 
invests a lot of money into developing alternative ecologically friendly sources of energy 
and is considered one of the world leaders in this industry.409 
 
In its energy strategy up to 2050, Denmark proclaims two basic ideas: its grand aim to 
become independent of coal, oil and gas and the target to increase share of (renewable) 
energy to 33% by 2020.410 This energy vision is in striking contrast with the Russian 
grand energy vision in the world, particularly in the Arctic. 
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The Russian government regards nuclear power as one of the reliable and most effective 
solutions for energy-supply in the Arctic.411 Nowadays, the Rosatom State Nuclear 
Energy Corporation is one of the main Russian actors in the Arctic. Being officially an 
only authorized operator of the NSR, Rosatom is also responsible for building icebreakers 
and power supply in the Arctic.412 The Arctic is regarded as a test site for new developed 
Rosatom’s technologies.413 Particularly, Rosatom is preoccupied by the construction of 
movable and underwater power plants with low power capacities of 5-6 MW or 20-30 
MW to be employed in off-shore field in the Arctic.414  
 
At present, Rosatom is transporting the world's only floating nuclear power station ‘the 
Akademik Lomonosov’ to the town Pevek, with the population under 5000 on the 
Chukotka peninsula.415 The station is supposed to provide energy for the town which is 
significant for the development of the NSR.416 Rosatom sees movable nuclear power 
stations as promising export products. Once the tested models prove their operational 
stability they will become items for export. The interest to the presenting items was 
already expressed by different states such as China, Indonesia, Malyasia, Argentina, 
Namibia.417 The elaborating of floating nuclear power stations caused a lot of criticism 
from the environmentalists.418 However, Rosatom’s representatives and proponents insist 
on safety of their exploitation and emphasize such advantages as possibility to supply 
energy to remote areas regardless of transport infrastructure and reducing carbon dioxide 
footprint in the Arctic.419  
 
Hence, the tendency of Danish-Russian relations in the field of energy supply in the Arctic 
is of both more cooperation (energy efficiency) and less cooperation (energy sypply) 
moods. Since there is a great contradiction between Danish and Russian views on the 
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possibility of using nuclear power in the Arctic, there is little expectation for cooperation 
in the field of energy supply. 
 
Meanwhile, there is still a way for cooperation in this field. In general, Russia aims to 
rely on non-carbon dioxide energy in the Arctic, including not only nuclear power plants, 
but also wind and hydropower plants.420 The Danish involvement into Russian Arctic 
projects concerning wind and hydropower plants is likely, taking into account that 
Denmark is one of the recognized leaders in this area. Moreover, there is an operational 
experience in the development of the wind power plants between Denmark and Russia. 
For instance, Rosatom has an experience of cooperation with Danish company DIS in 
constructing wind power stations in Adygeya in 2018.421  However, one should admit that 
renewable energy sources are not a top priority now. There is no Russian Federal Projects 
on the development of renewable energy sources in the Arctic. 422 
 
Afterwards, there are two facets of Danish-Russian relations in the Arctic in terms of 
energy. On the one hand, there is a great opportunity for cooperation in energy efficiency 
matters with Danfoss activities in Russia as a good example of it. On the other hand, there 
is a different vision on sources of energy supply in the Arctic. Danish companies are 
mainly focused on the proliferation of non-nuclear renewable sources of energy while 
Russian energy companies, particularly Rosatom, are primarily focused on nuclear 
development and regard the Arctic as a proving ground for its future export-orientated 
products. Meanwhile, there is a space for cooperation in the field of the renewable energy 
in the Arctic in the future. 
 
 
4.8. Tourism 
 
Ice melting has a positive influence on tourism development in the Arctic, making the 
Arctic more accessible. Aproximately 10.2 millin tourists visit the Arctic annually.423  
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Nowadays, the Arctic witnesses an increase in the number of tourists.424 Particularly, 
since the 1990s the amount of tourists visiting Greenland has increased from 3.500 to 
approximately 35.000 annually.425The same tendency occurs in the Russian Federation. 
In 2018, the number of tourists visiting the Russian Arctic increased by 20%, compared 
with the data of 2016.426 About 527.000 tourists choose the Russian Arctic as their 
destination every year.427  Such attractions as visiting the national park “Russian Arctic” 
and a cruise to the North Pole – an exclusive Russian tourist product – are the main Arctic 
tourist products offered by Russia. 428  
 
Danish and Russian governments are supportive to the development of the Arctic tourism. 
Russia maintains the Arctic tourism via the adoption of laws and regulations on the Arctic 
tourism, setting up a working group on its development within the body of the Federal 
Agency Russia Tourism, opening new national parks, promoting the Arctic as a tourist 
destination in mass media and developing the tourist infrastructure.429 
 
The Kingdom of Denmark has the similar approach to the Arctic tourism. In The Danish 
Arctic Strategy, tourism is defined as one of the promising branches in the Arctic 
economy.430 It is worth mentioning that it is Greenland which takes the most active part 
in promoting the Arctic tourism within the Kingdom of Denmark.431 The Greenland 
government regards tourism as the third possible pillar of Greenland’s economy alongside 
with mining and fishery.432 To boost tourism, the Greenland government takes great 
measures to improve its tourist infrastructure. Particularly, the government has adopted 
the plan of renovation of two existing airports and the construction of the third one, 
demanding the enormous investments.433 Greenland is also good at elaborating tourist 
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packages.434 Due to these activities, Greenland was included in the Top 10 countries to 
visit in 2016 by the travel guidebook publisher Lonely Planet.435  
 
However, despite some positive results in the development of the Arctic tourism there is 
a common understanding that the Arctic tourism still has a long way to pass before being 
equally developed sector in the world tourism.436 The main obstacles on this way are still 
non-well developed infrastructure, relatively high prices on tourist products, the 
complexity of possible emergence situations.437 Being potentially prosperous in future, 
the development of the Arctic tourism demands cooperation of the countries in tourist 
infrastructure sector, especially sea routes infrastructure, multilateral exchange of 
information and achievements on rescue operations and monitoring tourist vessels. These 
activities are especially important for promoting the international cruise lines in the 
Arctic. Therefore, the Arctic tourism is a topic of the further discussion within the Arctic 
Economic Council where multilateral cooperation can be achieved.438 
   
Thus, there is a great possibility for cooperation between Denmark and Russia in the 
Arctic tourism, mainly in the development of the international cruise lines. However, 
there is no explicit witness of such cooperation, which can be determined by the fact that 
cruise tourism in the Arctic has not got its full development yet. The tourism development 
is in concordance with the increase of the accessibility of the region. More access will 
bring more tourists. Nowadays, both countries invest into the Arctic tourism meanwhile 
they admit the assumption that it will take time to rip real benefits from it.  
 
 
Main outlines 
 
There is no evidence of the development of Danish-Russian relations in oil and gas 
exploitation. Danish and Russian companies did not and do not take part in any major 
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joint international projects on exploiting oil and gas of the Arctic. This phenomenon can 
be explained by several reasons.  
 
Firstly, both countries experience undeniable pressure as a result of tension at the global 
level. The sanctions are a great obstacle on the way of collaboration. Secondly, both 
countries has similar challenges in the Arctic oil and gas development. They are in the 
extreme need for investments. Finally, both countries have different business 
environment. Danish oil and gas companies withdraw from the market while Russian 
companies intend to promote their positons there. 
 
There are promising relations in shipping. Being a maritime country, Denmark has an 
explicit interest in the exploitation of the NSR. This interest manifests itself in journeys 
made by Danish carriers via the NSR and Danish-Russian SAO meetings on cooperation 
in shipping. However, the further development of the Danish-Russian relations in the 
dimension of the Arctic shipping depends on the expanding of ice-free waters in the 
Arctic, the economical profits from exploiting the NSR and the Russian government’s 
wish to utilize the NSR as a transit route. The same assumptions can be referred to the 
relations in the sector of the Arctic infrastructure.  
 
The cooperation can be also traced in shipbuilding sector where the Russian shipbuilding 
companies employ the equipment produced by Danish companies. High Russian 
authorities, particular Vladimir Putin, emphasized the possibility and importance of 
further development of this cooperation. Meanwhile, the relations in this sector are mainly 
determined by the international political situation. Nowadays, due to the sanctions 
imposed on the Russian shipbuilding plants with the following Russian primary 
orientations on working with Asian partners and import-substitution, the Danish-Russian 
relations in shipbuilding are expected to face great obstacles on the way of their 
development.  
 
The most successful relations are registered in fishery, where Russia, Greenland and the 
Faroe Islands promote cooperation in allocation of fishery quotas in the Arctic waters and 
development of the fish trade. Here, the political situation at the global level again plays 
its significant role. Exactly, the non-EU status of Greenland and the Faroe Islands allow 
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them to avoid the Russian ban on the fish import from the EU countries and rip benefits 
from expelling such competitors as Norway and Canada from Russian import market. 
 
In the energy sector, the relations are two-facet. The energy-efficiency field witnesses a 
long tradition of cooperation. To be more specific, there is an employment of the Danish 
technologies in providing energy-efficiency solution for icebreakers, mining and  
processing plants and houses. Russia regards the issue of energy-efficiency as one of the 
main solutions of the Arctic sustainable development. Thus, there is a great expectation 
that the tendency of cooperation will strengthen.  
 
The energy supply field on the ground witnesses less cooperation. At present, Denmark 
and Russia have different views on what can become the main source of energy supply 
in the Arctic. Denmark is a great proponent of non-nuclear sources whereas Russia is a 
proponent of using floating nuclear power stations as a way to provide power in the 
Arctic. However, there is still the opportunity for cooperation in the development of 
renewable energy in the Arctic. 
 
Finally, there is a possibility for cooperation in the Arctic tourism, particularly in the 
development of the international Arctic cruise lines. Meanwhile, the destiny of this 
cooperation is determined by the expanding of the Arctic ice-free waters with the 
following increase in the accessibility of the region and business interests, profits. 
Nowadays, the Arctic tourism is still at the starting line of its development. 
 
Thus, Danish-Russian economic relations in the Arctic have ambiguous nature. There are 
pros and cons for their development the character of which is determined by political, 
economic and geographical variables. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
87 
 
V. DANISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS IN THE ARCTIC IN TERMS OF MILITARY 
 
The Arctic has an obvious significance in military terms. Primarily, it is strategically 
important for the US and Russia. The Arctic is the place where the US and Russia can 
most successfully strike each other with missiles.439 Therefore, particularly Russia-the 
US rivalry is a potential source of Arctic militarization.440   
  
Nowadays, the military architecture of the Arctic consists of eight states. Four of five 
Arctic coast states are NATO members. Three other Arctic states: Norway, Sweden and 
Finland – are not NATO members, but they actively promote their cooperation with 
NATO through common exercises.441 Russia has supported its interests in the Arctic by 
independent military presence.  
 
Figure 15. Arctic Military Facilities: Russia –red; Norway – yellow; Denmark/Greenland 
–green; Canada –violet, U. S. – blue (Source: Roston and Migliozzi 2017) 
 
There is also a close cooperation between Nordic countries in the Nordic Defence 
Cooperation (NorDefCo).442 NATO presence in the Arctic is represented by the united 
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system of air defence, missile warning system AWACS.443 NATO forces are also 
responsible for patrolling the air space of Iceland.444 Turning to Denmark’s place in the 
Arctic in these terms, it is worth saying that Denmark is a NATO and the EU member.445 
However, in case of the EU membership, Denmark is out of the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy of the EU.446 As for the Arctic, it means that the EU cannot determine 
Danish security police in this area. 
  
At present, the Arctic experiences increase in military exercises, number of armed forces 
and modernization of Arctic armed forces. These developments made a lot of politicians 
and journalists speak about the militarization of the Arctic.447 Most explicitly, this 
tendency has been reflected by British authorities. In august 2018, Britain’s Parliamentary 
Defence Committee published “On Thin Ice: UK Defence into the Arctic” where the 
militarization of the Arctic was pointed out.448 
 
However, an analysis of Danish-Russian military relations and the position of the US and 
Russian officials shows that talks on the militarization of the Arctic that sound in the US, 
Russia and other countries, are often ways to get public attention or get benefits in internal 
political struggles within the countries. 
 
Russia has a great military interest in the Arctic. The Arctic is referred as one of the main 
security priorities of Russian Armed forces.449 The Arctic got its fixed position in the 
Russian military sector.450 Following the words of the Russian president Vladimir Putin, 
“Russia shall have all that is necessary in the Arctic to protect Russian national and 
security interest”.451 Arctic ice melting, opening new sea routes, exploitation of oil and 
gas deposits make the Arctic the strategically significant region not only in military terms 
but also in economic, social and environmental terms.  
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The increasing of human activity in the Arctic caused the appearance of new challenging 
tasks before the Russian armed forces.452 These tasks were mentioned in several Russian 
documents. They are enforcement sovereignty, maritime surveillance, support for 
scientific expedition, patrolling the NSR, search and rescue services, environmental 
surveillance and the Arctic clearing.453  
 
To meet these challenges, the Russian government rationalizes the administration of the 
armed forces in the Arctic and stands for the process of their modernization. Particularly, 
Russia has created special Arctic armed forces united under one Arctic commendation 
called “Sever” (dubbed “North”).454 In addition, Russia has built new military cities in 
the Arctic and founded the farthest northern military base in the world called “Trilistnik” 
on the island “Zemlya Fransa Iosifa.”455 Russia also invests many funds into renovation 
and restoring Arctic airfields and the development of new Arctic technics, weapons and 
icebreakers. 456 
 
Some of new military items were presented at the parade on the Victory Day in 2017.457 
Russia has also set up a net of new radar stations.458 The Russian government pays 
peculiar attention to regular military exercises in the Arctic, specifically, to the exercise 
of paratroopers and swat forces since mobile forces are crucial for successful military 
operations in such weather conditions as they are in the Arctic.459 
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According to Russian authorities, all these efforts are supposed to promote sustainable 
Arctic development. They are determined by increasing human activities in the Arctic 
caused by ice melting.460 Russian politicians promote the idea of “non-militarized” 
Arctic.461 They are firmly on the position that there is no need for proliferating NATO 
involvement into the Arctic military sector, for the region proved its peacefulness even in 
the time of military and political conflicts in other regions.462 Russian interest in obtaining 
economic benefits from Arctic development and the development of the NSR, oil and gas 
deposits, in particular, determines Russian intention to keep the Arctic away from military 
conflicts.  
 
This is the reason why Russia has been increasing its military activity in the Arctic, which 
is basically determined by the scope of new challenges in this region. Danish and the US 
authorities share this vision. 
  
Despite a lot of warning statements made by prominent American politicians about 
Russian militarization of the Arctic, in fact, official comments made by the US State 
department and the Chairman of NATO show the US endeavor not to put a great emphasis 
on Russian military actions.463 Following the words of special representative of the US 
on Arctic affairs, Admiral Robert Papp, “Russia does in the Arctic exactly that what we 
would do in the case of increasing transport volume to the shore.”464 
 
Even in the backdrop of the escalating conflict between the US and Russia on Ukrainian 
crisis, the Chairman of NATO calls for cooperation with Russia in the Arctic.465 It is 
worth noticing that recent exercises conducted by NATO forces called ‘Trident Juncture’ 
from October, 25 to November, 7, 2018 in the Arctic caused some tension with Russia.466 
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One should keep in mind that this operation is considered the biggest one since the end 
of the Cold War. However, even after this military exercise at the Arctic Forum held in 
St. Petersburg the Russian president Vladimir Putin underlines the lack of any dramatic 
tension in the Arctic zone.467 
 
Danish position on the question of militarization in the Arctic is the same. Being a small 
state, Denmark is highly interested in maintaining demilitarized Arctic, because 
otherwise, in case of real conflicts between the US and Russia, Denmark can be squeezed 
between two powers.468 Moreover, regarding the specific status of Greenland in the 
Kingdom of Denmark, in case of the worst scenario to come into life, Denmark is at risk 
to lose control over Greenland.469  
 
Inspired by this endeavor, the Danish government is against solid NATO involvement 
into the Arctic affairs.470 It was explicitly represented in the Danish authorities’ comments 
sent to Britain’s Parliamentary Defence Committee. To be more accurate, the Danish 
Government stated the following: “Presently, Denmark sees no need for an increased 
military engagement on enhance operative role for NATO in the Arctic.”471 Denmark 
excuses Russian military presence in the Arctic with a strong necessity to guarantee its 
increasing economic and human activities on the ground.472  
 
Following the same driver, Denmark strengthens its military presence in the region.473 
Particularly, in 2008, Danish Defence Commission placed the Arctic as a fix point for 
future defence plans.474 From then on, Denmark has rationalized the Arctic command 
structures by uniting Greenland command and the Faroe Islands command in a common 
Arctic command situated in Nuuk.475 It also has been increasing investments into armed 
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forces in the Arctic and employed the local population of Greenland in Armed Forces 
Activities.476 
    
The latest Danish defence agreement, a document for the Danish military provisions for 
the period 2018-2023, emphasizes the necessity of increasing military presence in the 
Arctic and further investment into the process.477 Among the main challenges of the 
region setting before the armed forces climate change and increased activity are 
declared.478 It is worth noticing that in spite of general tendency of emphasizing assertive 
Russian actions in the world, particularly in the Baltic Sea Region, Russia is not identified 
as a threat in the case of the Arctic.479  
 
However, there were attempts to portray Russia as a possible military threat in the Arctic. 
For instance, according to the report of the Danish intelligence services, Russia is still 
likely to assertively demonstrate its military power in the region in the showdown over 
the territory surrounding the North Pole.480 Meanwhile, these attempts were condemned 
by some Danish politicians and were not reflected in the agreement.481  
 
Following the provisions of the previous and current defence agreements, the Danish 
armed forces are to fulfill the following tasks in the Arctic: sovereignty enforcement, 
patrolling surveillance, environmental protection, fishery inspection and search and 
rescue in the Arctic and most importantly providing possibilities for international 
cooperation.482 Danish armed forces in the Arctic are not presented at large. There is a 
military base station Nord, Air Group West at Kangerlussuaq  the Defence Guard   at 
Mestersvig, a liaison unit at the Thule base, 12 men of the Sirius Patrol, modern inspection 
vessels of the KNUD RASMUSSEN class.483 Danish armed forces do not possess 
icebrakers in the Arctic.484 However, in terms of the Arctic it is not the amount of 
                                                          
476 Danish Parliament 2013, 14, 27 
477 Danish Parliament 2018, 10 
478 Ibid, 1 
479 Ibid, 1 
480 Damkjær 2016; Forsvarets Efterretningstjeneste 2016, Danish Defence Intelligence 
Service 2018, 33-37 
481 Danish Parliament 2018; Damkjær 2016 
482 Danish Parliament 2009; Danish Parliament 2013; Danish Parliament 2018 
483 Danish Ministry of Defence 2019 
484 The US Coast Guard Office of Waterways and Ocean Policy 2017 
93 
 
technical equipment but the mobility of forces that is the key to the success of military 
operations.485  
 
Analysis of the Danish defence agreement shows that the Arctic is a field of Danish 
security policy but not a priority field. The distribution of military budget proves that 
Arctic is still marginal area of Danish security policy.486 The latest defence agreement, in 
contrast to the previous one aiming to reduce military budget, proclaims a significant rise 
in military budget from 1.17% to 1,5% by 2023 in order to partially meet NATO military 
spending target 2% for NATO member states.487  
 
 
Figure 16. Danish Military Budget Distribution (Source: Author’s Compilation Based on 
the Danish Defence Agreement 2018-2023)  
 
                                                          
485 Khramchikhin 2011, 5 
486 Danish Parliament 2018, 15-16 
487 Ibid 
94 
 
Proclaiming NATO as the main pillar of the Danish security, Denmark government 
decided to ensure their commitment to the NATO by increasing its military budget. It is 
particularly followed through actions promoting Danish involvement into NATO 
activities: establishing deployable brigade and enhancement units and equipment for 
participations in NATO’s international operations, which are primarily financed.488 At 
the same time, the Arctic occupies only the 13th position out of 16 initiatives in terms of 
financing.489 The difference in financing is quite striking. The total investment in the 
deployable brigade is about 50 times more than in the Arctic.490  
 
Hence, the security policy aim of the Kingdom in the Arctic is maintaining the Arctic as 
a low tension area.491 Denmark does not see a great necessity for dramatic increase in its 
military presence in the Arctic since it does not register any evidence of militarization in 
the region. Most representatives of Danish authorities believe in the secure nature of 
Russian military activities in the Arctic that is propped by economic interests of Russia 
to avoid conflict there.492  
 
In my opinion, the US position of demilitarizing Russian actions in the Arctic also plays 
its role in the Danish approach as Danish foreign policy is, at great extent, preoccupied 
by the task to strengthen its position as the US ally. This Danish approach fosters Danish-
Russian military cooperation in the Arctic.  
 
Most evidently, this cooperation is realized in the fulfillment of the Arctic Council 
agreements such as agreement on cooperation on aeronautical and maritime search and 
rescue in the Arctic as well as agreement on cooperation on marine oil pollution 
preparedness and response in the Arctic.493 There are also meetings of high military 
authorities from Danish and Russian sides that took place within the Arctic Council.494  
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Apart from the Arctic Council, Danish and Russian armed forces experience operational 
cooperation within the Arctic Coast Guard Forum established in 2015.495 Particularly, 
both countries took part in the first common operative exercise “The Arctic Guardian” 
held September 5-9, 2017.496 The object of the exercise was to examine cooperation 
between search and rescue units of Arctic Coast Guard Forum members.497 Danish and 
Russian armed forces also took part in the second combined search and rescue and mass 
rescue operation exercise “Pollaris 2019”.498  
 
Based on these facts, the analysis leads to the conclusion that Danish-Russian military 
relations in the Arctic, in its core, can be characterized within the framework of 
cooperation. Both countries manifest their good intentions while strengthening their 
military presence in the Arctic. They justify this narrative by new challenges in the Arctic 
determined by the increasing human activity in the region. Countries also have common 
position on the question of NATO involvement in Arctic security affairs. Danish and 
Russian representatives are against NATO further involvement in the Arctic. Finally, 
there is operational cooperation between Danish and Russian armed forces within the 
Arctic Coast Guard Forum.                  
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VI. DANISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS IN THE ARCTIC IN TERMS OF SCIENTIFIC 
AND ENVIRONMENTAL DEVELOPMENT 
 
Environmental and scientific fields are often referred by different researchers as the most 
natural sphere of cooperation between countries in the Arctic.499 If the environment is 
called as the most possible area of cooperation, the scientific area raises a little bit more 
questions about possibility of cooperation. Most researchers agree with the fact that there 
is a big chance for cooperation in fundamental science, such as sharing and developing 
information on climate change, animal and bird population, studying possible new 
diseases in the Arctic, prevention of pollution, dealing with urgent situations etc. 
 
However, the entire cooperation in sharing practical-instrumental science knowledge 
such as development of natural resources: oil and gas deposits exploration, development 
of infrastructure technologies - is less expected.500 As one can see, the development of 
Danish-Russian relations in the Arctic in terms of environmental and scientific affairs 
almost correspond to these ideas. 
 
There is a great cooperation in solving environmental problems. This collaboration can 
be traced to 1987, when Mikhail Gorbachev pointed out in his famous Murmansk speech 
that there was a demand to transform previously high militarized Arctic into a zone of 
peace with international collaboration on urgent civilian matters, such as environmental 
protection. 501 
 
Afterwards, the platforms for international cooperation on environmental issues, i.e. the 
Barents Euro-Arctic Council, the Barents Regional Council and the Northern Dimension 
were established.502 Most importantly, the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy was 
adopted by the “Arctic Eight” that became the base for foundation of the Arctic Council 
in 1996.503 
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Nowadays, the Arctic Council is the main platform for international collaboration on 
Arctic environmental problems.504 Denmark and Russia, being permanent members of 
the Arctic Counicl and the Barrents Euro-Arctic Council and the Barrents Regional 
Council, take an active part in promoting multilateral agreements on environmental 
issues.  
 
Moreover, the collaboration on environmental issues has rather multilateral than bilateral 
character. Despite the bilateral agreement on cooperation in the field of environmental 
protection signed in 1993 between Denmark and Russia, Danish-Russian actions on 
protecting fragile ecological system of the Arctic are made primarily through adopting 
multilateral agreements, projects and regulations, developed within such international 
organizations as the Arctic Council, the Barrents Euro-Arctic Council, the Barrents 
Regional Council and the Northern Dimension. 
 
The explicit example of such cooperation is legally binding agreement on cooperation on 
marine oil pollution preparedness and response in the Artic, signed in 2013 by members 
of the Arctic Council including Denmark and Russia.505 One should notice that the Arctic 
Council is the main platform for Danish-Russian environmental cooperation, whereas the 
Barrents Euro-Arctic Council and the Barrents Regional Council are less significant for 
this tangible cooperation due to de-facto Denmark’s “advanced observer’s status” in this 
organization.506  
 
This multilateral facet of Danish-Russian relations in the environmental sector seems to 
be reasonable. The size and scope of environmental challenges in the Arctic are so 
extensive that only involvement of all Arctic actors, particularly states, can produce 
adequate response.507 The multilateral tradition of response to environmental challenges 
in the Arctic can be traced to the beginning of environmental cooperation in the Arctic 
when in 1987 Mikhail Gorbachev in fact launched the era of turning the Arctic from a 
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highly militarized zone into a zone of peace with international cooperation on 
environmental protection. 508 
 
As for science, here are two trends in Danish-Russian relations that can be registered. 
First, there is evidence of cooperation in the fundamental science sector. Secondly, there 
is a lack of cooperation in practical science. Like in the environmental field, the academic 
relations develop more through international forums rather than through bilateral 
agreements. The cooperation in the fundamental science occurs within such international 
organizations as the Arctic Council, the Barrents Euro-Arctic Council, the Barrents 
Regional Council, the Northern Dimension and the International Arctic Science 
Committee.509  
 
Danish and Russian representatives like other member-states of such organizations take 
an active part in producing projects and agreements to foster sharing scientific knowledge 
and its following development. One of the tangible results of such activity turned out to 
be an agreement on enhanced international Arctic scientific cooperation signed by the 
members of the Arctic Council in 2017.510 Another common Arctic States achievement 
is the establishment of the Sustaining Arctic Observing System (SAON) following 2011 
Arctic Council NUUC Declaration.511 This system is vital for strengthening observation 
capacity by sharing observation data. 
 
Apart from international organizations, Danish-Russian scientific cooperation occurs 
through agreements between higher educational institutions.512 This collaboration 
includes exchange programmes, guest lectures and participation in scientific expeditions. 
For instance, Danish representatives took part in the Arctic Floating University – an 
expedition organized by Russian Northern (Arctic) Federal University named after 
Mikhail Lomonosov. Danish universities can be also found among partners of the Russian 
universities concerning the Arctic.513 However, one detail should not be omitted. 
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Obviously, Russian universities have more bonds with their counterparts in other Arctic 
states, for instance, Finland, Norway and Sweden. There are a lot of bilateral joint 
programmes with the mentioned countries.514  
When it comes to Danish university partners, in most cases, it is a collaboration through 
multilateral exchange programmes and networks. North-to-North Programme and the 
University of the Arctic are some of the outstanding examples of this assumption.515 Still, 
there is no overwhelming bilateral agreement on cooperation between the Danish Agency 
for Science, Technology and Innovation and the Russian Research Agency.516  
 
This state of affairs witnesses two main trends: the rise of academic interest to the Arctic, 
on the one hand, and the lack of priority from both sides to cooperate on academic issues 
on a bilateral base, on the other hand. Existing multilateral platforms are considered 
sufficient to satisfy academic needs of both states.  
 
The most explicit example of Danish-Russian bilateral scientific cooperation in the 
development of Arctic fundamental knowledge is cooperation that occurred during the 
process of scientific back up of official claims on extending of the continental shelf by 
Denmark and Russia.517   
 
In general, there is a cooperation in such areas as sharing and developing information on 
climate change, animal and bird population, studying possible new diseases in the Arctic, 
prevention of pollution, dealing with urgent situations etc. However, when it comes to 
technologies and innovations as well as practical knowledge that can be used by business 
entities, there is less cooperation. This can be explained by bare business ambitions of 
both countries that are inherently competitive. There is no clear common interest, so there 
is less cooperation. The sanctions imposed by the EU on Russia in 2014 hinder the 
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cooperation in technology sphere as they prohibit European companies to collaborate 
with the Russian oil and gas companies, primary actors of technology development.518  
 
Also, the indicator of poor state of Danish-Russian relations in terms of technology and 
innovations is the fact that Denmark has no single innovation center in Russia unlike other 
countries including China, Brazil, etc.519 Despite the general trend of margining 
development of Danish-Russian cooperation in the field of technology and innovations, 
still some good examples of this cooperation can be found. In 2010, the Declaration on 
Partnership for Modernization between the Kingdom of Denmark and the Russian 
Federation was signed.520 Alongside with this Declaration, the Danish company 
DANFOSS, the leading company in energy-efiiciency technologies with its own quarters 
in Russia, signed an agreement with the Russian research center Skolkovo on the 
establishment of its research center on the base of Skolkovo in 2013.521 However, this 
case is more of exception rather than a rule in the area of technologies and innovations as 
a whole and in relation to the Arctic, in particular.  
 
The possibility of future cooperation in this specific area even in case of lifting sanctions 
still seems to be unlikely. This thesis can be proved by some reasons. Firstly, business 
entities  pursue  private interests, i.e. economic profit, that will force them to follow the 
competitive spirit so that they are not inclined to share technologies and innovations with 
their business counterparts. Secondly, the energetic as one of the main spheres demanding 
innovations is not suitable area for scientific cooperation between Denmark and Russia 
as both states have a different vision on energy architecture of the Arctic. Particularly, the 
Russian side regards nuclear power as one of the main source of energy in the Arctic 
while Denmark is a strong opponent to nuclear power energy and focuses on the 
development of green energy resources.  
 
Afterwards, Danish-Russian scientific cooperation has multilateral character. Still, this 
cooperation is multi-dimensional. Fundamental academic issues on the Arctic draw the 
main attention and cooperation efforts as Denmark and Russia share common interest in 
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the field. However, the area of technologies and innovations is less developed as it is 
basically defined by business interests that do not always correspond to states’ ones. Of 
course, in terms of bilateral relations, this cooperation is of more Russian concern than 
Danish one as Russia is keen on developing the Arctic natural resources that require 
profound and sophisticated technologies and equipment that Russian companies do not 
own.522 Perhaps, this area is likely to be evolved in future, mainly, by Russian initiative. 
As for environmental issues, they also bear a multilateral facet due to the nature of the 
Arctic environmental challenges demanding international response that goes beyond the 
efforts of one or two states. This concept is widely accepted by Denmark and Russia as 
well. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
522 RIA NOVOSTI February 9, 2016 
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CONCLUSION 
 
My master’s thesis has investigated the relationship between states of the Kingdom of 
Denmark and the Russian Federation in the Arctic in 2007-2019. The main purpose of 
the work was to extend the current body of research due to its limited nature by examining 
Danish-Russian relations in the Arctic. 
 
Obviously, the Arctic itself has attracted great attention of scholars from all over the 
world. Still, Danish-Russian relations in the Arctic have not been in focus of researchers. 
I argue that this lack of studies can be explained by predominant interest of academics to 
the relationship of ‘big’ state actors as Russia and the US. Meanwhile, the interactions 
occurring between small states and great powers in the region have been neglected. 
 
Apparently, the Arctic is a region of profits and fulfilling national interests for all Arctic 
states, including Russia and Denmark. This statement goes in line with geopolitical 
perspective. My thesis is based on the analysis of their relationship in such areas as Arctic 
governance, economy, military sector, science and the environment as it is in these 
particular spheres where Denmark and Russia interact.  
 
By and large, my research revealed that the main driver of Danish and Russian policies 
in the region is enshrined in the endeavor to get relative gains, particularly, to enhance 
their power capabilities in comparison with non-Arctic states. The Arctic with its vast 
deposits of natural resources, new sea routes, its military significance in the game of great 
and super great powers, its opportunities to expand states’ territories, is crucial for 
increasing such Danish and Russian power capabilities as territory, economy and military 
strength.  
 
The Arctic is also prominent for Danish and Russian political stability and competence. 
In the case of Denmark, the Arctic issue, to be more specific, Greenland issue is the 
question of political cohesion and existence of the Kingdom of Denmark as it is now. In 
its turn, the Arctic is the base of the Russian stability.  
 
Danish and Russian interests in the Arctic are predetermined by their position in the 
international system. Particularly, Denmark as a small state finds the Arctic policy as one 
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of the ways to bandwagon its super great power ally, the US. Besides, the Arctic also 
presents a forum for Danish politicians to promote peace and cooperation between great 
powers. This is an inherited interest of the small state located next to the rivalry 
super/great powers as Russia and the US. The peaceful surrounding is mainly prominent 
for reserving the entity of the Kingdom of Denmark, to be more accurate, to keep 
Greenland in. That is highly important for preserving and promoting the strategic 
significance of Denmark in the eyes of the US. Non-conflict Arctic is also essential for 
Denmark as the mean to avoid the worst scenario for small states to be squeezed in the 
conflict of great and super great powers as Russia and the US. 
 
Russia is also highly interested in keeping peace in the Arctic as non-conflict environment 
is primarily necessary for gaining economic benefits from oil, gas, mineral and bio-
recourses exploitation as well as from utilization of the NSR. Being a great power, Russia 
regards the Arctic as the way to obtain “energetic super power” status of the 21st century, 
which is important to foster its great power status and get preferences in the great/super 
great powers games.  
 
Therefore, Denmark and Russia are extremely interested in maintaining cooperation 
trends in the Arctic. These cooperation trends can be traced in such sectors of Danish-
Russian relations as Arctic governance, economy, science, the environment and military 
sector.  
 
There is a great level of Danish-Russian cooperation in terms of the Arctic governance 
which is determined by the common vision of the Arctic governance architecture. Both 
states promote existing multi-layer pattern of governance with sovereign actors, i.e. 
states, in its heart. In other words, Denmark and Russia pursue the policy of exclusion of 
non-Arctic states from direct participation in Arctic affairs and prevent any attempts to 
internationalize the Arctic following the Antarctic model by asserting sufficiency of the 
current Arctic governance model to deal with challenges in the region.  
 
Particularly, Denmark and Russia are constantly enhancing the legitimacy of the Arctic 
Council through adopting the Ilulissat Declaration and further legal binding agreements. 
They are great proponents of the process of sovereignizing the Arctic resources through 
the applications of the territorial claims in the Arctic.  
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Danish and Russian overlapping claims on the expanding their continental shelves are 
considered by mass media and some researchers as an explicit illustration of Danish-
Russian confrontation which, in fact, can be perceived as the sample of their cooperation 
on a way to sovereignize Arctic territories. The mutual scientific Danish-Russian 
cooperation on preparing these claims is based on the presumption that both claims 
include intertwined knowledge of both parties. The main preoccupation of the claims is 
not the conflict issue, i.e. delimitation of the territories between Denmark and Russia in 
the Arctic, but their common intention to get scientific evidence that claimed areas are an 
object within sovereign rather than international authority.  
 
Both the common interest of Denmark and Russia in supporting non-conflict zone in the 
Arctic and their own declarations of commitment to peaceful solution of the disputed 
territories are compelling reasons to expect peaceful delimitation of the claimed territories 
in case of recognizing them as sovereign objects.  
 
At the global level, this state-centric model of the Arctic governance does not initiate any 
conflict between the US and Russia. Despite the fact that the US proclaims against non-
international status of the NSR, the US does not take any real serious attempts to argue 
the NSR Russian territorial status and does not step against Danish and Russian claims 
within the UN.  
 
Therefore, the Arctic governance witnesses clear common Danish and Russian interests 
in promoting the sovereignizing model instead of international model, which does not 
meet any resistance at the global level. These are common interests and their favourable 
state of affairs at the global level which determine the collaboration nature of Danish-
Russian relations in terms of the Arctic governance. 
 
Danish-Russian economic relations in the Arctic have ambiguous nature. Their character 
is determined by political, economic and geographical variables. As a whole, three groups 
of sectors of the economy can be distinguished. The first group includes sectors with great 
level of Danish-Russian cooperation. They are fishery, energy-efficiency and shipping. 
The second group consists of sectors with the absence of relations and little expectation 
for their further development. They are the Arctic oil and gas exploitation and the Arctic 
energy supply. The third group comprises sectors with currently non-developed relations 
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or the ones experiencing difficulties but having a potential for the future. They are 
tourism, the NSR infrastructure and shipbuilding.  
 
My thesis identified three main drivers of Danish-Russian relations in economy. They are 
of different nature. 
 
The first driver is a political situation at the global level. The EU sanctions imposed on 
Russian oil and gas industries as well as shipbuilding sector generally prevent the 
development of the Danish-Russian relations in these sectors of economy. At the same 
time, the absence of sanction issue in the relationship between Greenland, the Faroe 
Islands and Russia determines boosting of their economic relations, particular in the 
fishing industry. 
 
The second driver is business interests, to be more specific the issues of the economic 
profit and general business strategy. The economic profit seems to be the most obvious 
driver of any economic relations. However, as it could be seen on the example of oil and 
gas sector as well as in the case of shipbuilding sector, the profit driver can abdicate its 
position to the political one. The economic profit is the main driver in the development 
of Danish-Russian relations in such sectors as energy-efficiency, shipping, tourism, the 
NSR infrastructure and fishery. The sectors proving their relevant profitability such as 
energy-efficiency, and fishery are already witnessing current Danish-Russian 
cooperation, while sectors not proving their relevant profitability but having potential to 
get it in the future, such as tourism, infrastructure and shipping, are expected to witness 
this cooperation soon.  
 
The business strategies of companies are also important in the determination of Danish-
Russian economic relations in the Arctic. For instance, the decision of Danish oil and gas 
companies to withdraw from the oil and gas market to concentrate on other branches of 
their business is one of the reasons that defines the absence of Danish-Russian relations 
in the Arctic oil and gas sector. The focus of Danish companies working in energy sector 
on the development of renewable energy, while the Russian energy company Rosatom 
promotes nuclear power as a main source of the energy supplier in the Arctic, causes little 
expectations about Danish-Russian cooperation in the issue of energy supply in the 
Arctic. Meanwhile, the Russian government’s support of the idea of possible renewable 
106 
 
energy sector development in the Arctic leaves the chance for Danish-Russian 
cooperation in the energy – supply in the Arctic. 
 
The third driver is the climate change. It is exactly the climate change that has brought 
the Arctic on the top of the global economy agenda. The further Arctic melting will 
directly define the potential development of Danish-Russian relations in such sectors as 
shipping, fishery, tourism and infrastructure. 
 
Danish-Russian military relations in the Arctic, in general, can be defined within the 
framework of cooperation. Despite the fact of Denmark’s NATO membership and current 
tension between NATO and Russia in the International System, Danish-Russian relations 
in the Arctic do not experience any profound detrimental effect in the field of the Arctic 
military relations. This phenomenon can be explained by several reasons.  
 
Firstly, NATO-Russian relations in the Arctic dimension in general are comparatively 
peaceful in spite of some echoes from general tension of NATO-Russian relations 
expressed in expanding NATO military exercises in the Arctic and claims of several 
NATO counties like Great Britain, Norway and Netherland on assertive nature of the 
Russian military presence in the Arctic. NATO authorities as well as Russian authorities 
constantly express their commitment not to militarize the Arctic and peacefully resolve 
any conflicts in the region. More than that, the US Department of States constantly defines 
Russian military presence in the Arctic in terms of natural Russian endeavors to enforce 
its sovereignty rights on its legitimate territory. Thus, NATO-Russian relations in the 
Arctic mainly have non-conflict nature.  
 
Secondly, Denmark and Russia have a lot in common in their approaches to the Arctic 
military affairs. Denmark and Russia share a common vision on the Arctic military 
architecture. They are similar in their intention to minimize NATO involvement in the 
Arctic affairs. Denmark opposes the greater NATO involvement due to the question of 
“security dilemma”. Denmark sees possible increasing NATO actions in the Arctic as a 
trigger of misunderstanding and following militarizing of the Arctic which in turn can put 
Denmark into a predicament between super/great powers. Russia as a great power is 
against the escalation of NATO participation in the Arctic affairs since Russia perceives 
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this possible action as the first step to militarization of the Arctic bringing the additional 
security issues on the table. 
 
Apart from the common vision on the Arctic military architecture, Denmark and Russia   
proclaim the similar drivers of their increasing military presence in the Arctic. Both 
countries do not register any assertive nature in their own actions as well as the actions 
of their counterparts. The increasing human activity in the region, which in turn creates 
new tasks before armed forces such as enforcement sovereignty, maritime surveillance, 
support for scientific expedition, patrolling the opening sea route, search and rescue 
services, environmental surveillance and the Arctic clearing, is defined as a fundamental 
reason for the increasing military presence in the Arctic by both states. 
 
Finally, Denmark and Russia have an experience of operational cooperation between their 
armed forces in the Arctic. Specifically, both states took place in the exercises conducted 
by the Arctic Coast Guard Forum.  
 
There is significant cooperation in terms of science and the environment. Being the oldest 
sector of cooperation among the Arctic states, environmental issues continue to play a 
role of one of the most promising sectors of cooperation between Denmark and Russia. 
Meanwhile, this collaboration is of more multilateral than bilateral nature. The 
cooperation occurs within such international organizations as the Arctic Council, the Euro 
Barrents Council, the Euro Barrents Regional Council and the Northern Dimension 
through adopting agreements on environmental issues. The multilateral facet of Danish-
Russian cooperation is determined by the grand scope of the environmental challenges in 
the Arctic. Thus, cooperation in this field is required for the Arctic sustainable 
development. 
 
Like the environmental sector, the scientific sector witnesses Danish-Russian cooperation 
in the multilateral dimension. Particularly, Denmark and Russia cooperate through 
international forums and multilateral common exchange programmes and the Arctic 
University network. A rare explicit example of bilateral cooperation is collaboration 
fulfilled by Denmark and Russia in preparing territorial claims in the Arctic. This 
multilateral nature of scientific cooperation can be explained by globalization process in 
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the development of the global science in general. Apart from it, multilateral cooperation 
in science seems to be an adequate response to great scientific tasks set by the Arctic.  
 
It is worth noticing that Danish-Russian cooperation in science is two-fold. On the one 
hand, there is fruitful cooperation in the field of fundamental science, which is determined 
by common states’ clear interests to accelerate their knowledge about Arctic nature. On 
the other hand, there are rare cases of cooperation in the field of technologies and 
innovations which, in turn, is determined both by inherent competitive states’ interests to 
be leaders in technological know-hows to promote their economic and scientific profiles 
at the global level. Particularly, sanctions imposed by the US and the EU on Russia since 
2014 have been preventing Danish-Russian cooperation in this area in all possible ways.  
 
To sum up, Danish-Russian relations in the Arctic have a cooperative nature and based 
on the analysis of the present state of affairs at the global and national levels the 
cooperation mode is likely to be support by not only Denmark and Russia, but also the 
rest of the Arctic states. First and foremost, making the Arctic another zone of conflict in 
the nearest future will hinder opportunities of the states to satisfy their interests, primarily 
economic ones, in the region. The main drivers of these relations can be determined in 
terms of the neorealist school. Any military conflict in the Arctic will lead to the disaster 
in the global dimension due to its unique geographical position and significance for the 
rest of the world in terms of the environment. In case of military conflicts, setting the 
Arctic into the situation of threat to the world, the Arctic states can lose their privileges 
in the Arctic governance, provoking other big actors, for example, China and the EU, to 
question the existing Arctic governance structure with the Arctic states in its core.  
 
My research is an early attempt to analyze Danish-Russian relations in the Arctic. In this 
research, I have presented general trends and drivers of Danish-Russian relations. I 
believe the explored topic still has areas of further elaboration that go beyond the width 
and scope of my research. These sectors are the cultural dimension of Danish-Russian 
relations, indigenous people policies of both states in the Arctic, Danish-Russian relations 
in a broader context of the Arctic stability and sustainability in terms of economy and 
military issues. I consider these issues can be fascinating topics for studies.  
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